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1 INTRODUCTION 
I am leaning against the rail looking out at the sea – or what used to be one. Now it is just 
an eerie sight of abandoned fishing vessels full of graffiti and sand as far as the eye can see. I 
estimate the drop from the edge where I am standing to the bottom to be around 10 meters, 
and I wonder how that amount of water could possibly vanish. The information board 
behind me tells me that the Aral Sea used to be the 4th biggest inland sea in the world, until 
the Soviets started diverting rivers leading to it to grow “white gold” – cotton. I immediately 
start searching for the label in my shirt and as I see the text “100% cotton” it makes me 
think; even though my shirt was not made of cotton for which the Aral Sea was drained, it is 
surely not the only example of the disastrous impacts that fabric production has on the 
environment. The desiccation of the Aral Sea has been called one of the planet’s worst 
environmental disasters1 – but will it remain the worst for long? 
 
The fashion industry is a major user of cotton. A typical pair of jeans (made entirely of cotton) 
is responsible for 33,4kg of CO2 equivalent during its entire lifecycle;2 this is more than a 
100km driven in an average car.3 Now imagine the amount of jeans produced and bought 
around the world in, for instance, a year – that 100km car drive has quickly multiplied into 
something way more alarming. Of course, cotton is not the only – or even the major – fibre 
used in the fashion industry, and the popularity of other materials, such as plastic, has grown 
considerably in the past decades. All fibres, whether natural or not, have some impacts on 
the environment. The production and treatment of textiles is especially detrimental for the 
climate, but a lot of clothes also end up as waste due to e.g. overproduction or low quality. 
The fashion industry is naturally among the biggest users of textiles and is also responsible 
for large amounts of textile waste being burned or landfilled.  
 
It seems that during the 21st century, both consumers and the fashion industry itself have 
woken up to the negative impacts the industry has on climate. Brands have started offering 
 
1 Antonio Guterres, ‘Aral Sea “Probably Biggest Ecological Catastrophe of Our Time”, Secretary-General 
Says, Stressing Need to Act Forcefully in Preventing Tragedy from Multiplying’ 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sgsm18565.doc.htm> accessed 7 April 2020. 
2 Cotton and fabric production, garment manufacturing, transportation and distribution, consumer care, 
recycling and end of life. 
3 Levi Strauss & Co., ‘THE LIFE CYCLE OF A JEAN - Understanding the Environmental Impact of a Pair 
of Levi’s 501 Jeans’ (2015) <http://www.levistrauss.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Full-LCA-Results-
Deck-FINAL.pdf> accessed 7 April 2020. 
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conscious collections and consumers seem to focus ever more on the sustainability of 
clothing, but one piece of the puzzle is still missing; regulation. A range of non-governmental 
organisations, private companies and advocacy groups have initiated campaigns and created 
standards in order to combat climate change within the fashion industry, but these initiatives 
are not legally binding and there are (usually) no methods for ensuring compliance. Among 
these initiatives is the UN Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action (the ‘Charter’), which 
was signed in 2018 by some major fashion stakeholders. The Charter brings an interesting 
variation to the assortment of commitments in the fashion industry. However, the questions 
arising from the Charter are the same as those arising from any voluntary industry 
commitment; are these initiatives being used solely for utilitarian reasons? 
 
1.1 Research questions and methodology 
This study aims to answer the following questions: 
1) Are the commitments in the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action concrete, 
i.e. do they really address the industry’s impact on climate? 
2) How is compliance ensured, considering it is a voluntary instrument? 
3) How are the actors held accountable in case of non-compliance? 
 
One of the major concerns relating to the Charter is that it is used as a form of greenwashing – 
the act of deceiving customers by providing misleading information or creating a false 
impression of a company’s product being environmentally friendlier than it truly is.4 By 
answering the research questions, this paper intends to discover the true nature of the 
initiative; the questions presented above represent some of the key issue areas in relation to 
the concept of greenwashing. The aim is to offer an industry-wide perspective of the issues 
relating to the Charter, which is why questions about corporate social responsibility shall not 
be included. Questions relating to marketing practices, the role of the media and the 
responsibilities of consumers shall also be left outside the scope of this paper due to two major 
reasons: to avoid unnecessary complication of the analysis and because each of the 
aforementioned issues would be worth a thorough analysis of their own.  
 
 
4 For example, a company might claim that its products are made from recycled materials when, in fact, the 
amount of recycled materials in the product is non-existent. Will Kenton, ‘Greenwashing’ (Investopedia, 2020) 
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenwashing.asp> accessed 11 February 2020.  
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Research mechanisms used in this paper shall follow the doctrinal method. The core of the 
issue lies in questions relating to global governance – such as the authority of the governors, 
the role and responsibilities of the actors involved and the enforcement of private rules. As 
the existing research on the subject is extensive, this paper shall focus only on certain aspects 
of global governance; the constitution, forms and practice of authority as well as 
transnational regulation as a form of global governance and its forms and purposes. At the 
core of this research is the Charter, which is an industry specific commitment initiated by 
the UN Climate Change and signed by different fashion industry stakeholders (e.g. fashion 
brands, retail and shipping companies). Taking the nature of this instrument into account, 
the main points of focus in this paper shall be a) the authority of the actors involved and b) 
industry self-regulation as a form of global governance, and especially the issues it creates. 
The academic research as well as the analysis of the Charter relies on academic literature 
written on the subject of global governance and transnational regulation. The literature has 
been chosen on the basis of relevance, and further limited by examining the views of the 
authors. The sources used in the paper offer a variety of interpretations of the concepts, 
which gives the opportunity to approach the questions from slightly different angles. The 
intention is to combine some of the views to form an adequate description of the issue at 
hand.  
 
A major part of the substance also comes from research reports and statistics by leading 
industry experts – e.g. Ellen MacArthur Foundation and the Global Fashion Alliance. These 
reports have been regularly quoted by private companies, international organisations and 
other researchers as well. The aforementioned entities have gained authority in the industry 
by promoting the mitigation of negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry, 
spreading information to companies and the public alike, and by actively taking part in the 
conversation regarding the climate consciousness of the fashion industry. The existing 
regulation concerning the industry is non-existent – the only legislation worth mentioning in 
connection with the fashion industry is the European Union (EU) circular economy 
legislative package adopted in 2018, which shall be shortly covered as part of the general 
overview of the regulatory situation in the fashion industry. In the absence of legislation and 
hence, case law, certain non-legal industry initiatives (for instance the G7 Fashion Pact and 
the 2020 Commitment by the Global Fashion Agenda) shall be utilised as part of the 
research. The scope of the analysis of the existing non-legal initiatives is limited to initiatives 
aimed specifically towards the fashion industry. Hence, other industry initiatives, which 
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might also have relevance in the fashion industry (relating to e.g. chemicals or logistics), shall 
not be covered. 
 
This paper shall start with a short introduction to the history of the fashion industry and 
move on to demonstrate the impacts the industry has on the environment and specifically on 
climate change. Chapter 3 shall explore the range of environmental initiatives in the 
industry, both legal and non-legal ones, and introduce a few examples in more detail – for 
instance The Charter and the initiatives connected to it. Chapter 4 shall intend to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of the concepts of global governance and transnational 
regulation, and the different elements relating to those concepts which are deemed relevant 
in the light of the context of this paper (e.g. the constitution of authority and different forms 
of transnational regulation). Chapter 5 shall present the analysis of the Charter based on the 
terms and concepts presented in chapter 4 and shall aim to provide some answers to the 
research questions. It shall also include a short analysis of the Charter in practice based on a 
few empirical studies conducted in connection with the Charter. Chapter 6 shall summarise 
the main findings and offers some personal points of view of the author.  
 
1.2 Key concepts 
Circular (economy) model – a model based on the reuse, repair and recycling of materials and 
thus extending their lifecycle. It aims to reduce waste to the minimum and create value by 
reusing existing materials as long as possible. It is an alternative to the prevalent linear model.5 
Climate Change – a human-induced change in climate, which results in changes in the 
properties of the atmosphere and which can be observed over an extended time period.6 
CO2eq – a metric measure used to compare emissions from various greenhouse gases on the 
basis of their global-warming potential.7  
 
 
5 Didier Bourguignon, ‘Closing the Loop New Circular Economy Package’ [2016] European Parliamentary 
Research Service 9 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573899/EPRS_BRI%282016%2957389
9_EN.pdf> accessed 11 February 2020. 
6 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992. Article 1. 
7 European Union, ‘Carbon Dioxide Equivalent’ (2013) <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Carbon_dioxide_equivalent> accessed 8 February 2020. 
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End-of-life phase – when a product can no longer be used in any form (whole, in part or 
recycled for raw materials) it is disposed of.8  
Fashion Industry – the producing of raw materials and the manufacturing, distribution and 
consumption of textiles, clothing, accessories and footwear.9 
Fast fashion – the business of transforming new trends seen on catwalks and on celebrities as 
quickly as possible into affordable clothing for the average consumer.10 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions – emissions caused by the primary greenhouse gases: water vapor 
(H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone (O3). The gases 
“absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of radiation emitted 
by the Earth’s ocean and land surface, by the atmosphere itself, and by clouds”, thus causing 
the greenhouse effect.11  
Greenwashing – deceiving customers by providing misleading information or creating a false 
impression of a company’s product being environmentally friendlier than it truly is.12 
Linear model – the extensive use of non-renewable resources to produce garments which are 
oftentimes utilised for a short period of time, after which they are thrown away and landfilled 
/ burned (the linear model is often referred to as the “take-make-waste” model).13 
  
 
8 Clare Lissaman, ‘What Is Circular Fashion?’ [2019] Common Objective 
<https://www.commonobjective.co/article/what-is-circular-fashion> accessed 6 May 2020. 
9 UNFCCC, ‘Milestone Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action Launched’ (2018) 
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2018/12/milestone-fashion-industry-charter-for-
climate-action-launched/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
10 Audrey Stanton, ‘What Is Fast Fashion, Anyway?’ (The Good Trade, 2020) 
<https://www.thegoodtrade.com/features/what-is-fast-fashion> accessed 8 February 2020. 
11 A Alegría H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, M. Tignor, E. Poloczanska, K. 
Mintenbeck and NM Weyer M. Nicolai, A. Okem, J. Petzold, B. Rama (eds), ‘IPCC, 2019: Annex I: 
Glossary’, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (2019) 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/11/12_SROCC_AnnexI-Glossary_FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 11 February 2020. p 687. 
12 Kenton (n 4). 
13 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘A New Textiles Economy: Redesigning Fashion’s Future’ (2017) 
<https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publications/A-New-Textiles-
Economy_Full-Report_Updated_1-12-17.pdf> accessed 8 February 2020. p 19. 
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2 THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
This chapter shall first shortly explore the transformation of the fashion industry to its current 
form and afterwards demonstrate its impacts on both the climate change and the 
environment in general. 
 
2.1 Short history of the fashion industry 
The fashion industry has not always been like this – where new clothes are bought at an 
unprecedented rate, and the origin as well as the final fate of a garment is a mystery for the 
consumer. As a matter of fact, until fairly recently, both textiles and garments were produced 
by hand at home – until the Industrial Revolution introduced the sewing machine. First 
patented in 1846, the sewing machine made garment production considerably faster and 
more efficient, both at home and throughout the entire industry. Indeed, the increased 
efficacy brought on by this new invention was one reason behind the fall in prices and the 
increase in the amount of clothing sold. Around the beginning of the 20th century the first so 
called sweatshops14 emerged, but a significant part of clothing was still made at home.  
 
It was not until the 2nd World War that the fashion industry was forced to change – 
standardised mass production was required for the uniforms worn by soldiers and other war-
time workers. When the war ended, people were already used to the standardised clothing 
and became more receptive towards mass-production. This eventually led to the real craze 
– which began in the 1960s – when the younger generations started to see clothing as a way 
to express their personality, rather than having a focus on its practicality. This, and the 
simultaneous rise of the middle class-population around the world, lead to a rapid increase 
in the demand for cheap clothing. The increased demand meant that new styles had to be 
introduced as a constant flow – and so they were. This eventually led to the birth of the fast 
fashion industry; an industry which can easily and cheaply produce massive amounts of new 
collections and sell them with a low price to a reasonably well-earning consumer.15 
 
 
14 Small local shops, where clothing was made in teams of workers with the help of machinery. 
15 Sara Idacavage, ‘Fashion History: The Origins of Fast Fashion’ [2016] Fashionista 
<https://fashionista.com/2016/06/what-is-fast-fashion> accessed 8 February 2020. 
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The fashion industry evolved in less than a century from made to order -garments, which 
were intended to last for years, to standardised mass-production. Nowadays, fast-fashion 
brands produce up to 52 micro-seasons a year – this means new collections in stores every 
week – while some brands get new styles shipped in daily.16 Even with the increased demand 
that the fashion industry has seen in the past decades, it comes as no surprise that not all of 
the produced garments will ever be sold. Instead, they end up in landfills or are burned with 
the rest of our waste. The fashion industry is responsible for many environmentally harmful 
practices as well as emissions contributing to climate change. The next chapter shall explore 
these impacts in more detail.  
 
2.2 The fashion industry in numbers 
The fashion industry, as defined by the United Nations (UN), “encompasses textiles, 
clothing, leather, and footwear industries, from the production of raw materials and 
manufacturing of garments, accessories and footwear to their distribution and 
consumption”.17 The industry thus combines numerous smaller sectors, including all the 
steps of the value chain; from the making of the raw materials to the consumption of the final 
product.  
 
Keeping in mind the broad definition of the term, it is clear that the fashion industry is a key 
economic sector on a global scale: its value has been estimated anywhere between $1.3 
trillion and $2.4 trillion dollars.18 Fashion is also a major employer worldwide, employing 
between 70 and 300 million people across the steps of the value chain.19 It is thus safe to say 
that fashion has a major role to play in global economics and job creation, which does not 
make the current debate about its environmental impacts any easier – as a linear industry20 
with long value chains and an energy intensive production, it is bound to have negative 
impacts on the environment, and especially on climate. 
 
 
16 Stanton (n 10).  
17 UNFCCC, ‘Milestone Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action Launched’ (n 9). 
18 Foundation (n 13). 
19 Most of whom are women. ibid. p 18,36. ‘The UN Alliance for Sustainable Fashion’ 
<https://unfashionalliance.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
20 See chapter 1.2. 
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The growing worry about the climate impacts of the industry is partly due to the increase in 
demand arising from the rapid growth of wealth starting in the 20th century, as explained in 
the previous chapter. Clothing sales have more than doubled globally in the past 20 years.21 
In 2016 the per capita consumption of apparel fibres was more than 30 kg in the United 
States and Europe.22 The global consumption was estimated at 11,4 kg per capita – this 
amounts to 442 kg of CO2eq per capita, which is equivalent to e.g. a 4100 km-long flight or 
a 2400 km long car ride.23 At the same time, clothing utilisation (the number of times a 
garment is used before disposing of it) decreased by 36% from 2000 to 201624 – according 
to some studies, clothes are only worn seven or eight times before throwing them away.25 
This results in an enormous amount of textile waste: more than 80% of clothing ends up in 
landfills or incineration each year26 and an equivalent of a garbage truck of textiles is burned 
or landfilled every second.27  
 
However, the end-of-life -phase of clothing is not the only environmentally harmful part of 
a garment’s lifecycle. One of the major contributors to climate change in the fashion industry 
are the different phases of textile creation – fibre production, yarn and fabric preparation, 
and dyeing and finishing. Even though textiles are not solely utilised by the fashion industry, 
clothing makes up more than 60% of the total textile use globally.28 In the 2018 study 
“Measuring Fashion” by Quantis these stages amount to more than 90% of the total impact 
of the fashion industry on climate change,29 largely due to the fact that these processes are 
 
21 Foundation (n 13). p 18. 
22 Quantis, ‘Measuring Fashion 2018: Environmental Impact of the Global Apparel and Footwear Industries 
Study Full Report and Methodological Considerations’ (2018) <https://quantis-intl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/measuringfashion_globalimpactstudy_full-report_quantis_cwf_2018a.pdf> 
accessed 8 February 2020. p 19. 
23 According to the Quantis report, 11,4kg in fibre materials represents approximately 11 pairs of jeans and 
13 t-shirts. ibid.  
24 Foundation (n 13). p 19. 
25 Nathalie Remy, Eveline Speelman and Steven Swartz, ‘Style That’s Sustainable: A New Fast-Fashion 
Formula’ (2016) <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/style-thats-
sustainable-a-new-fast-fashion-formula#> accessed 8 February 2020. Foundation (n 13). p 36. 
26 Throughout the entire life cycle of the garment. CommonObjective, ‘Mapping the Global Fashion 
Industry: Key Findings’ (2018) 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c59af0590f9041e3580eff2/t/5c62d674ee6eb0235cfe246a/154998
1404832/CO+DATA_Mapping+the+Industry_Key+Findings.pdf> accessed 8 February 2020. P 10. 
27 UNEP, ‘Putting the Brakes on Fast Fashion’ (2018) https://www.unenvironment.org/news 
<https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/putting-brakes-fast-fashion> accessed 8 February 
2020. 
28 Foundation (n 13). p 18. 
29 Quantis (n 22). p 19. 
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usually located in countries that still use hard coal and natural gas for electricity and heat 
production.30  
 
The problem is not only the amount, but the kind of textiles used: 97% of the materials used 
in clothing production is new – plastic being the major material.31 The second most widely 
used material, cotton, is an extremely water-intensive material: the production of one cotton 
shirt requires 2 700 litres of water, which is equal to the amount one person would drink in 
2,5 years.32 Cotton farming also requires the use of pesticides and fertilisers, the estimated 
amounts used in a year being 200 000 tonnes and 8 million tonnes respectively.33 The 
chemicals used in farming are harmful both to the environment and to humans – the farmers 
suffer from the toxins while working with the raw materials, and some of the chemicals may 
be retained in the final products, thereby affecting the wearer as well.34 Nevertheless, cotton 
is a natural fibre, and its biggest environmental impacts are concentrated on the production 
phase – as a natural fibre it takes only between a week and five months to biodegrade after 
being thrown away.35 Plastic, on the other hand, is more problematic. All synthetic fibres are 
non-biodegradable and can take up to 200 years to break down.36 Furthermore, washing 
synthetic textiles (such as polyester, nylon and acrylic) is a major contributor to microfibres 
entering into our oceans – each year 0,5 million tonnes of plastic microfibres is released into 
the oceans from the simple act of washing synthetic textiles.37 This is equal to more than 50 
billion plastic bottles.38 In addition, the production of plastic-based fibres for textiles uses 
around 340 million barrels of oil every year, which makes the industry highly reliable on 
non-renewable resources.39 
 
All in all, the fashion industry as a whole is responsible for 8-10% of the world’s greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and 20% of the industrial wastewater pollution worldwide.40 The GHG 
 
30 ibid. p 19-21. 
31 Foundation (n 13). p 20. 
32 Elizabeth Reichart and Deborah Drew, ‘By the Numbers: The Economic, Social and Environmental 
Impacts of “Fast Fashion”’ [2019] World Resources Institute <https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/01/numbers-
economic-social-and-environmental-impacts-fast-fashion> accessed 8 February 2020. 
33 Foundation (n 13). p 38. 
34 ibid. 
35 ‘End of Life - Close The Loop’ <https://www.close-the-loop.be/en/phase/3/end-of-life> accessed 8 
February 2020. 
36 ibid. 
37 Foundation (n 13). p 39. 
38 ibid.  
39 ibid. p 38. 
40 ‘The UN Alliance for Sustainable Fashion’ (n 19). 
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emissions of the fashion industry exceed those of all international flights and maritime 
shipping combined.41 If the fashion industry continues to grow at the projected rate, it is 
estimated that by 2050 it will consume more than ¼ of the world’s carbon budget (measured 
from the 2°C target pathway).42 The amount of microfibres in oceans would increase by 0,2 
million tonnes, and more than 150 million tonnes of clothing would be landfilled or burned 
only in 2050.43 This alarming prospect has led to actions throughout the fashion industry in 
order to address environmentally harmful practices and to slow down the climate change – 
the initiatives range from raising awareness among consumers to creating tools for companies 
to measure their sustainability. The next chapter will shortly explore the nature of these 
initiatives and draw attention to the lack of legal instruments in the industry. 
  
 
41 Foundation (n 13). p 38. 
42 ibid. p 39. 
43 ibid.  
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3 FASHION INDUSTRY REGULATION 
The previous chapter presented the impacts the fashion industry has on the environment 
and the climate change, thus demonstrating that there indeed is a problem to deal with. This 
chapter shall introduce the existing regulatory framework and initiatives in the industry 
concerning its environmental impacts.  
 
3.1 An overview of the regulation in the industry  
In the past few decades, consumers as well as various industries have shifted towards a more 
environmentally conscious way of thinking. The possibility of the planet being irreparably 
damaged in the near future due to the actions (or inactions) of the humankind has risen 
serious concerns among many industries – including the fashion industry. At first glance, the 
amount of commitments and initiatives in the fashion industry on a global level might seem 
impressive – when examined more closely, however, it becomes evident that there is a serious 
lack of legal and otherwise binding rules and standards in the industry.  
 
The existing initiatives concern an abundance of issues; such as materials,44 the use of 
chemicals in the textile industry,45 rights of the industry workers,46 forums for collaboration 
and green consultancy companies,47 initiatives to raise awareness of the public,48 tools and 
testing systems for companies,49  and some aimed to promote the mitigation of the climate 
impact of the fashion industry on a local or regional level.50 In addition to these wider-scale 
environmental initiatives, some brands have started their own green campaigns – for 
example Levi Strauss has initiated the Climate Action Strategy 2025, with which the 
 
44 E.g. ‘Global Organic Textile Standard’ <https://www.global-standard.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
and ‘Better Cotton Initiative’ <https://bettercotton.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
45 E.g. ECHA, ‘REACH Regulation’ <https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/reach/legislation> accessed 8 
February 2020. And Zero Discharge of Hazardous Chemicals, ‘Roadmap to Zero’ (2020) 
<https://www.roadmaptozero.com/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
46 E.g. ‘Clean Clothes Campaign’ <https://cleanclothes.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. And ‘Fair Wear’ 
<https://www.fairwear.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
47 E.g. ‘Global Fashion Agenda’ <https://globalfashionagenda.com/> accessed 8 February 2020. ‘Common 
Objective’ <https://www.commonobjective.co/> accessed 8 February 2020. And ‘Eco-Age’ <https://eco-
age.com/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
48 E.g. ‘Fashion Revolution’ <https://www.fashionrevolution.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
49 E.g. SAC, ‘The Higg Index’ (Sustainable Apparel Coalition, 2014) <https://apparelcoalition.org/the-higg-
index/> accessed 8 February 2020. ‘OEKO-TEX’ (2019) <https://www.oeko-tex.com/en/> accessed 8 
February 2020. And ‘Greenhouse Gas Protocol’ <https://ghgprotocol.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
50 E.g. ‘Sustainable Clothing Action Plan’ <https://www.wrap.org.uk/sustainable-textiles/scap> accessed 8 
February 2020. Nordic Fashion Association, ‘NICE Code of Conduct and Manual: For the Fashion and 
Textile Industry’ (2012) <http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/NICE2012.pdf> accessed 14 February 2020. 
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company aims to reduce their GHG emissions and switch to renewable energy across its 
value chain, among other things.51 One of the most widely used methods for tackling the 
climate impacts of the industry is the promotion of a circular economy model.52 The circular 
is model based on the reuse, repair and recycling of materials and thus extending their 
lifecycle. It aims to reduce waste to the minimum and create value by reusing existing 
materials as long as possible.53 It is an alternative to the prevalent linear model: the extensive 
use of non-renewable resources to produce garments which are oftentimes utilised for a short 
period of time, after which they are thrown away and landfilled or burned (the linear model 
is often referred to as the “take-make-waste” model).54 While the circular model might be 
better for the environment than the current model, it is not sufficient on its own. In order to 
comprehensively address the fashion industry’s impacts on climate change, other steps of the 
value chain, especially during the production phase, need to be taken into account as well. 
 
To offer a clearer picture of the nature and contents of the leading initiatives in the industry, 
the following parts shall shortly explore a few of the most wide-spread global commitments 
in the industry at the moment; the Global Fashion Agenda’s (GFA) 2020 commitment to 
make a transition towards a circular economy and the G7 Fashion Pact (the ‘Pact’). These 
initiatives are among the few industry-specific actions taken so far, but unfortunately, they 
represent only a small part of the whole industry (the GFA 2020 commitment has 90 
signatories, which represent 12,5% of the global fashion market55, and the G7 Fashion Pact 
has around 60 signatories56). 
 
3.1.1 GFA 2020 Commitment 
The GFA 2020 commitment was signed at Copenhagen Fashion Summit 2017 to support 
the fashion industry’s transfer towards a circular model. The commitment includes four 
action points, on which the participating companies have committed to take action by setting 
company-individual targets. The action points include 1) the implementation of design 
 
51 E.g. Levi Strauss & Co, ‘Climate Action Strategy 2025’ (2018) <http://www.levistrauss.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/LSCO_Climate_Action_Strategy_2025.pdf> accessed 8 February 2020. 
52 E.g. ‘The Ellen MacArthur Foundation’ <https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/> accessed 8 
February 2020. 
53 Bourguignon (n 5). 
54 Foundation (n 13). p 19. 
55 GlobalFashionAgenda, ‘Global Fashion Agenda - 2020 Commitment’ (2019) 
<https://globalfashionagenda.com/commitment/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
56 ‘The Fashion Pact’ <https://thefashionpact.org/?lang=en> accessed 8 February 2020. 
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strategies for cyclability, 2-3) an increase in the volume of used garments and footwear 
collected and resold, and 4) an increase in the share of garments and footwear made from 
recycled textiles. Despite its good intentions, the commitment has a few major issues. First, 
the action points are fairly broad and do not include any specific targets. Second, and 
deriving from the first issue, the participating companies are required to set the concrete 
targets themselves. This level of freedom could motivate the companies to strive for more 
ambitious measures, but the lack of binding minimum targets and methods for sanctioning 
in case of non-compliance might also lead to sub-standard performance. These issues are not 
uniquely the burden of this particular commitment – as will be discussed later on in this 
paper, issues concerning broad objectives and lack of sanctioning methods are present in 
almost all self-regulatory instruments. 
 
3.1.2 G7 Fashion Pact 
The G7 Fashion Pact was originally initiated by the French President, Emmanuel Macron, 
and presented to other Heads of State at the G7 Summit in 2019.57 The Pact is “a global 
coalition of companies in the fashion and textile industry -- including their suppliers and 
distributors”.58 The Pact has three main areas of work: stopping climate change, restoring 
biodiversity and protecting oceans. 59 It contains concrete measures and targets that directly 
address the abovementioned areas, and it allows for individual companies to choose 
“appropriate courses of action”. The Pact also states that there should be quantitative targets 
based on science, which both the individual companies and the industry as a whole could 
achieve.60 One of the most significant points that the Pact makes, is that a major part of the 
fashion industry’s impacts is made at farm level and in raw material sourcing locations.61 
The idea of the Pact is to bring together different existing initiatives and their targets, and 
thus form a broader framework based on those initiatives.62 The Pact also creates new targets 
to fill the gaps which are left by the existing initiatives.63 These new targets are separated to 
 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
60 ‘The G7 Fashion Pact’ (2019) <https://thefashionpact.org/?lang=en> accessed 8 February 2020. p 2. 
This refers to the Science Based Target Initiative, which the participants commit to implement.  
61 ibid. p 3. 
62 The Pact specifically refers to e.g. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the UNFCCC, ZDHC and Sustainable 
Apparel Coalition. ibid. p 3. 
63 ibid. 
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different levels of action: global commitments,64 concrete joint initiatives65 and 
accelerators.66 The global commitments are further separated to the different areas of work 
mentioned earlier – climate commitment67, biodiversity commitment and ocean 
commitment.68 The G7 Pact is a promising initiative, where the role of farming and raw 
materials production in creating environmental impacts is recognised. The scope of the Pact 
is more comprehensive than that of the Charter, since the Pact includes issues relating to 
biodiversity and oceans in addition to climate change. However, it is explicitly noted in the 
Pact that it is not a legally binding document, but rather a set of guidelines69 – thus including 
many of the same issues mentioned in connection with the GFA 2020 commitment. 
 
Despite the abundance of initiatives mentioned in this chapter, the fact remains that from an 
environmental point of view, the fashion industry is quite unregulated on a global scale. The 
existing initiatives and collaborations are a good start, but participation in them is voluntary 
and they often address only a certain material, for instance, and very few of the initiatives 
aim to regulate every step of the value chain. Thus, the industry lacks an instrument which 
would truly motivate (or oblige) the actors to address the climate impacts of their actions 
accordingly. This being said, there is one major legislative action concerning the industry; 
the EU legislative package on circular economy. The legislative package is not, however, 
without its issues, which shall be more thoroughly explored in the next chapter.  
 
3.1.3 EU legislation 
The EU is one of the few actors which have addressed (parts of) the fashion industry by 
means of legislation. The circular economy legislative package was adopted in 2018 in order 
to improve waste management within the EU – thus, it does not concern the fashion industry 
per se, but it does have considerable effects especially on the end-of-life-phase of clothing 
and other textile waste. The aim of the legislative package is to introduce new waste-
 
64 The global commitments ‘respond to the priorities set by the global community’ and the targets are based 
on e.g. the UN SDG’s and other UN conventions. ibid. 
65 Concrete joint initiatives, which require collaboration between fashion industry representatives and other 
industrial sectors on a range of subjects, such as transparency and accountability. 
66 The aim of the accelerators is to create an environment to achieve the concrete targets. The accelerators 
include supporting the transition to circular economy, educating and building awareness and supporting new 
financial investments and cross-sector collaboration. 
67 The Pact specifically refers to the Charter in the Climate Commitment by stating that the signatories shall 
support the Charter ‘with the ambition to implement SBTs’ (Science Based Targets). 
68 ‘The G7 Fashion Pact’ (n 60). p 4-5. 
69 ibid. p 3. 
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management targets concerning the reuse, recycling and landfilling as well as the prevention 
of waste, to strengthen provisions on extended producer responsibility, and to establish 
reporting obligations and calculation methods for the introduced targets.70 The package 
contains four legislative acts on waste management, three of which have an effect on the 
fashion industry: the new Waste Directive (EU) 2018/851, the Packaging Waste Directive 
(EU) 2018/852 and the Landfill Directive (EU) 2018/850.  The main targets concerning the 
fashion industry arising from the new Waste Directive are the obligation to collect textiles 
separately by 2025, and the reuse and recycling of waste at a municipal level at different 
intervals in the next 15 years.71 Other obligations arising from the other two directives 
include the management of packaging waste (e.g. material specific targets for the recycling 
of different packaging materials) and reducing the amount of waste landfilled (10% by 
2035).72  
 
Apart from the circular economy legislative package, the EU already has in place some 
regulation relevant for the fashion industry: for instance, the textile regulation of 2011 helps 
consumers make more sustainable choices by establishing stricter standards for e.g. marking 
the composition of fibres and textile products.73 The textile regulation does not directly 
address the environmental issues of the industry, but it requires all textile products to be 
labelled and to include the full fibre composition of the textile. This gives the conscious 
consumer a chance to inspect the content of the fabrics and make more sustainable decisions 
– the issue here is, naturally, that the responsibility of making the conscious choice falls 
entirely on the consumer.74  
 
In addition to the legal instruments mentioned above, there are some voluntary standards 
relating to textiles and clothing, some of which are specifically aimed at regulating the 
 
70 Didier Bourguignon, ‘Circular Economy Package: Four Legislative Proposals on Waste’, vol 593 (2018) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625108/EPRS_BRI(2018)625108_EN.pd
f> accessed 8 February 2020. p 1. 
71 N Šajn, ‘Environmental Impact of Textile and Clothes Industry. European Parliamentary Research 
Service.’ (2019) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/633143/EPRS_BRI(2019)633143_EN.pdf
> accessed 8 February 2020. p 7. 
72 ibid.  
73 (EU) No 1007/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 on textile fibre 
names and related labelling and marking of the fibre composition of textile products 2011 (Official Journal of 
the European Union) 1. 
74 Šajn (n 71). Bourguignon (n 70). ‘The EU Ecolabel for Textiles’ <www.ecolabel.eu> accessed 12 February 
2020. 
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environmental aspects of textiles.75 There are also some voluntary certification programmes, 
such as the EU Ecolabel for clothing and textiles. The criteria set by the EU Ecolabel 
guarantee a limited use of harmful substances (for health and environment), a reduction in 
water and air pollution, textile shrink resistance during washing and drying, as well as colour 
resistance to e.g. perspiration and light exposure.76 Other voluntary instruments include e.g. 
the EU Green Public Procurement (GPP) criteria for textiles, which may be adopted by 
member states and public authorities for the inclusion of so-called green requirements in 
public tenders.77 The aim of the criteria is to facilitate the reduction of environmental 
impacts when public authorities are purchasing goods and services.78 The use of the criteria 
is voluntary, and the authorities may decide whether they want to include all or only certain 
requirements in their tenders.79 
 
The circular economy legislative package is the main instrument within and by the EU to 
regulate the fashion industry. However, as it does not directly address the impacts of the 
fashion industry on climate change, and as it only concerns EU member states, it leaves many 
of the industry’s main issues unresolved. While these rules on waste management 
undoubtedly urge actors to make environmentally friendlier decisions in this aspect, the 
tackling of climate change requires stricter rules on e.g. emissions reductions across the whole 
value chain. The transformation to a circular economy model alone is not enough to address 
the industry’s impacts adequately. Nevertheless, it remains one of the only legal frameworks 
in place concerning at least parts of the industry. It also recognises the fact that the industry 
as a whole – all the way from producing fibres to making garments and shipping them all 
over the world for consumers to enjoy, to the disposal of the garments – is a major contributor 
to the climate change.  This is also one of the main realisations behind the Charter, which is 
one of the few global industry-wide commitments to address the climate impacts of the entire 
industry in the same package. 
  
 
75 European Committee for Standardization, ‘CEN/TC 248 - Textiles and Textile Products’ 
<https://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=204:7:0::::FSP_ORG_ID:6229&cs=1CD56AD35AEB8C1A2E7
CEE2BB715CAB9F> accessed 8 February 2020. 
76 ‘EU Ecolabel: Clothing and Textiles / Textile Products’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/ecat/category/en/14/textile-products> accessed 8 February 2020. 
77 ‘EU GPP Criteria’ <https://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/eu_gpp_criteria_en.htm> accessed 12 
February 2020. 
78 ‘EU Green Public Procurement Criteria for Textiles Products and Services’ (2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/pdf/criteria/textiles_2017.pdf> accessed 12 February 2020. 2. 
79 ‘EU GPP Criteria’ (n 77). 
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3.2 Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action 
”The Fashion Industry Charter brings together not only fashion brands, but manufacturers and 
retailers, logistic and investment companies, NGOs and media companies, and seeks to expand concrete 
engagement with all actors across the value chain to transform to a sustainable industry.”80 
 
In early 2018, the UN Climate Change Secretariat brought together some major fashion 
industry representatives including brands, manufacturers and raw material producers to 
discuss the industry’s impacts on climate change. The goal was to develop a holistic, 
collaborative approach to the issue based on shared principles, values and goals, as well as 
to contribute to the fulfilment of the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the Agenda 
2030.81 At the UN Climate Change Conference in December 2018 (COP24), with the 
support of UN Climate Change, 43 fashion industry leaders launched an initiative to 
pressure the industry to take action in the battle against climate change. The founding 
signatories include well-known brands and retailers, such as Adidas, H&M Group, Inditex,82 
Levi Strauss & Co. and PUMA SE.83 The initiative recognises the role of the fashion industry 
in combatting the climate change: on one hand, it is a major contributor to the GHG 
emissions, and on the other, it also has multiple opportunities to reduce those emissions.84 
During the drafting of the Charter, it was also understood that the fashion industry plays a 
crucial role in the global fulfilment of the Paris Agreement’s targets.85 As one of the largest 
industries in the world and due to the effect it has on culture and perceptions, it has a unique 
chance of creating a more environmentally conscious culture.86 Today, more than 100 
 
80 UNFCCC, ‘Strong Call to Action Issued at COP25 for First Anniversary of Fashion Industry Charter’ 
<https://unfccc.int/news/strong-call-to-action-issued-at-cop25-for-first-anniversary-of-fashion-industry-
charter> accessed 8 February 2020. 
81 UNFCCC, ‘Meetings of Fashion Industry Representatives’ <https://unfccc.int/climate-action/sectoral-
engagement/global-climate-action-in-fashion/meetings-of-fashion-industry-representatives> accessed 8 
February 2020. 
82 One of the world’s largest retailers including eight brands, e.g. Zara. 
83 ‘Participants in the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action’ (UN Climate Change) 
<https://unfccc.int/climate-action/sectoral-engagement/global-climate-action-in-fashion/fashion-industry-
charter-for-climate-action/participants-in-the-fashion-industry-charter-for-climate-action#eq-2> accessed 8 
February 2020. 
84 See Preamble of the Charter Sections 8 & 9. UNFCCC, ‘Milestone Fashion Industry Charter for Climate 
Action Launched’ (n 9).  
85 Fashion industry charter for climate action 2018 7. See preamble Section 3. 
86 British Fashion Council, ‘Fashion & Environment: An Overview of Fashion’s Environmental Impact & 
Opportunities for Action’ (2019) <inmotion.dhl/uploads/content/2019/03_Fashion/whitepaper.pdf> 
accessed 8 February 2020. 
  18 
brands and other fashion industry actors have committed to the Charter – either as 
signatories or supporting organisations.87    
 
3.2.1 Contents 
The Charter recognises that on its current trajectory, the industry will not be able to respond 
to the new requirements caused by climate change, and that the industry needs a more 
systemic change in order to effectively fight the climate change.88 The Charter’s vision is to 
achieve net-zero GHG emissions in the fashion industry by 2050. To achieve this, the 
Charter includes the following 16 targets, which the signatories aim to fulfil on their way to 
a cleaner future:  
1. Support the goals of the Paris Agreement in limiting global temperature rise to well 
below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels;  
2. Commit to 30 per cent aggregate GHG emission reductions in scope 1, 2 and 3 of 
the greenhouse gas protocol corporate standard,89 by 2030 against a baseline of no 
earlier than 2015; 
3. Commit to analysing and setting a decarbonisation pathway for the fashion industry 
drawing on methodologies from the science-based targets initiative;  
4. Quantify, track and publicly report our GHG emissions, consistent with standards 
and best practices of measurement and transparency;90 
5. Partner with experts, businesses, investors, environmental advocates and other 
stakeholders to develop and implement a decarbonisation strategy for the fashion 
industry, including by developing a work programme and tools necessary to achieve 
the GHG emission reduction targets;  
 
87 Signatories are committed to support the implementation of the principles contained in the Charter, both 
within their own organisation and by collaborating with the other signatories. Supporting organisations are 
also professionally engaged in the fashion industry but may not be in a position to implement the principles 
within their own organisations (e.g. some previously mentioned other initiatives in the industry, such as the 
Better Cotton Initiative and Fashion Revolution). See The Charter, Modalities of Work, Sections 3-5. 
‘Participants in the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action’ (n 83).  
88 See The Charter, Preamble, Section 6. 
89 See chapter 3.2.4 for the definition of Scopes 1, 2 and 3. 
90 The Charter mentions the following: Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon Climate Registry, The Climate 
Group, Global Investor Coalition, UN Global Compact, Covenant of Mayors, Climate Initiative Bonds, 
UNEP Climate Initiatives Platform. 
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6. Commit to prioritising materials with low-climate impact without affecting negatively 
other sustainability aspects;91  
7. Commit to continuously pursue energy efficiency measures and renewable energy in 
our value chain;  
8. As soon as possible and latest by 2025, commit to not installing new coal-fired boilers 
or other sources of coal-fired heat and power generation, on sites within Tier one and 
Tier two;92  
9. Support global transition to low-carbon transport by giving preference to low-carbon 
logistics;  
10. Support the movement towards circular business models and acknowledge the 
positive impact this will have towards reducing GHG emissions within the fashion 
sector;  
11. Establish a closer dialogue with consumers to increase awareness about the GHG 
emissions caused in the use and end-of-life phases of products, building towards 
changed consumer behaviours that reduce environmental impacts and extend the 
useful life of products;  
12. Partner with the finance community and policymakers to catalyse scalable solutions 
for a low-carbon economy throughout the sector;  
13. Together with other stakeholders, develop a strategy including targets and plans to 
advocate for the development of policies and laws to empower climate action in the 
fashion industry, especially in value chains;  
14. Establish a dialogue with governments in key countries to enable renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and the necessary infrastructure for a systemic change beyond the 
fashion industry;  
15. Communicate a shared vision and understanding through the development of a 
common strategy and messaging, including by championing climate action within 
the fashion industry through an enhanced and trust-building dialogue with relevant 
stakeholders;  
 
91 The Charter specifies that low-climate refers to ”a measure of the full set of geenhouse gases as opposed to 
only carbon dioxide”. Charter p. 3. 
92 The Charter refers to the Sustainable Apparel Coalition definitions of Tiers one and two. Tier one: final 
product manufacturing and assembly (or finished goods production). Tier two: material manufacturing (or 
finished materials production). See the Charter, p. 3. 
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16. Support the un climate change secretariat in its efforts to manage the tracking and 
recognition of progress of the commitments outlined in the fashion industry charter 
for climate action. 
As can be seen, the targets range from fairly specific ones (e.g. ceasing the use of coal in heat 
and power generation) to more general objectives (e.g. communicating a shared vision and 
understanding with a common strategy and messaging). In this paper, the focus shall be 
especially on the concrete targets – for instance, the commitment to reduce GHG emissions 
by 30% by 2030 (target no. 2) and the commitment to quantify, track and publicly report 
GHG emissions (target no. 4). By fulfilling the more general commitments included in the 
targets, the signatories aim to e.g. form best practices in the industry, identify gaps and 
strengthen collaboration between the participants, as well as to join resources and share tools 
to achieve the targets.93  
The signatories, along with the supporting organisations, aim to achieve these goals by 
working together in designated Working Groups – each having a focus on one or more of 
the Charter’s principles.94 To date, eight working groups have been established concerning 
the following areas of work: decarbonisation and GHG emission reductions, raw materials, 
manufacturing/energy, policy engagement, financial tools, promoting broader climate 
action, logistics95 and brand/retailer owned or operated emissions.96 These Working Groups 
aim to identify and amplify best practices, identify and address gaps, facilitate and strengthen 
collaboration between stakeholders, join resources and share tools and knowledge.97 
Resources for the Working Group activities are provided by the participating companies, 
and the role of the UN Climate Change is limited to supporting the participants by 
coordinating and facilitating communication and the delivery of the Working Groups.98 
The Charter establishes a framework for the industry in order to commit to the world-wide 
objectives of the Paris Agreement. It does this by underlining the industry’s commitment to 
 
93 UNFCCC, ‘About the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action’ (UN Climate Change, 2018) 
<https://unfccc.int/climate-action/sectoral-engagement/global-climate-action-in-fashion/about-the-
fashion-industry-charter-for-climate-action> accessed 4 January 2020. 
94 The Charter, Modalities of Work, Section 6. 
95 The logistics Working Group links existing transport initiatives from the Clean Cargo Group into the 
Charter. ‘Clean Cargo’ <https://www.clean-cargo.org/> accessed 8 February 2020. 
96 UNFCCC, ‘Fashion Industry Charter Working Groups’ <https://unfccc.int/climate-action/sectoral-
engagement/global-climate-action-in-fashion/fashion-industry-charter-working-groups#eq-1> accessed 31 
March 2020. 
97 ibid. 
98 The Charter, Modalities of Work, Section 15. 
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limiting the global warming as set out in the Paris Agreement, and facilitates the fulfilment 
of them by laying out more concrete objectives and offers methods for achieving those targets 
(i.e. the Working Groups).  
 
3.2.2 The Communique  
At the 2019 UN Climate Change Conference (COP25), the signatories of the Charter signed 
a Public Communique calling for governments to take a stronger role in supporting the 
fashion industry in its battle against the climate change.99 In addition to reaffirming their 
commitment to the objectives of the Charter, the signatories urged the political leaders of 
countries with major fashion production and consumer markets to partner with the 
signatories in order to bring the industry in line with the goal of limiting global temperature 
rise to 1.5 °C (as per the Paris Agreement). The signatories’ request for governments focuses 
mainly on the abolishment of fossil-fuel based energy sources and the transition to renewable 
energy by creating incentives as well as a suitable environment for companies to make the 
transfer. The requests include: 
o Providing businesses and financial institutions with predictable, transparent and 
motivating planning contexts for renewable energy investment, for example by 
ensuring government energy roadmaps are clearly communicated;  
o Responding to the urgent need for rapid scale-up of grid-connected renewable 
energy sources, and the swift phase-out of the highest-emitting fossil-fuel-based 
sources of energy, while ensuring a just and sustainable transition;  
o Providing incentives for a swift transition to renewable energy, for example through 
the provision of feed-in tariffs to manufacturers and suppliers that generate electricity 
from renewable sources, and which can feed their excess electricity into the public 
electricity grid;  
o Ensuring credible and legally recognised renewable electricity tariffs and power 
purchase agreements are available for fashion brands and manufacturers to purchase 
as part of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions;  
 
99 ‘Public Communique’ (2019) 
<unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Fashion_Charter_Call_for_Action_Communique.pdf> accessed 8 
February 2020. 
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o Creating an enabling environment for the rapid phase-out of non-renewable energy 
sources for all non-grid or high heat processes, for example through research and 
incentives for alternative biomass sources;  
o Working with the fashion industry to understand and address potential barriers to 
sector transformation and uptake of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technology, with a focus on understanding the key role of tariffs, subsidies or legal 
barriers at a national or state level. 
 
The Communique is essentially a political tool to put pressure on governments. Even so, a 
request addressed to political leaders to act and to help the fashion industry in the 
transformation towards a more sustainable path sends a strong message – the role of the 
Communique shall be more thoroughly analysed in chapter 5.3. In addition to the 
Communique, there are two other instruments incorporated in the targets of the Charter; 
the Paris Agreement and the GHG Protocol Corporate Standards. The next chapters shall 
explore these instruments in more detail. 
 
3.2.3 The Paris Agreement 
In 1997, three years after the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (the ‘Convention’ or the ‘UNFCCC’)100, the first global environmental 
treaty containing a set of binding emissions reduction targets was adopted: the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol, however, only bound developed countries and thus the 
heaviest polluters were left outside the scope of the treaty.101 As a result, at the COP17 the 
 
100 The UNFCCC is one of the three ‘Rio Conventions’, opened for signing at the ‘Rio Earth Summit’ in 
1992. The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, and to date has been ratified by 197 countries. The ultimate 
goal of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Art. 2.  UNFCCC, ‘What Is the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change?’ <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-
united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change> accessed 8 February 2020. 
101 Such as China, which resulted in the US deciding to withdraw its signatory in 2001 – the US argued that 
the exclusion of developing countries would cause serious harm to the US economy. See: Demand Climate 
Justice, ‘A Brief History of the United States and the UN Climate Change Negotiations’ [2017] Medium 
<https://worldat1c.org/a-brief-history-of-the-united-states-and-the-un-climate-change-negotiations-
bf7525d4ef13#sdfootnote7sym> accessed 8 February 2020. 
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signatories agreed to create a new, more comprehensive legal agreement to deal with climate 
change after the end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.102 
The solution was found in Paris at COP21, where the Parties to the UNFCCC reached a 
landmark environmental agreement to address the threats posed by climate change together. 
The Paris Agreement builds on the Convention and brings together nearly all nations of the 
world “to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of 
sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty” (Art. 2). The Paris Agreement is 
the first universal, legally binding global climate-agreement.103 The Paris Agreement entered 
into force on 4 November 2016, after 55 Parties to the Convention representing at a 
minimum 55% of the total global GHG emissions had ratified it (the ‘double threshold’). To 
date, of the 197 Parties to the Convention, 187 Parties have ratified the Paris Agreement.104 
The main goal of the Paris Agreement, as already mentioned above in connection with the 
Charter, is to limit global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature rise even further to 1,5°C (Art. 2).105 Other aims include increasing 
the ability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, foster climate change resilience 
and low GHG emissions development, and making finance flows consistent with a pathway 
towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilience (Art. 2).  
 
 
102 The Kyoto Protocol has had two commitment periods: 2008-2012 and 2013-2020. UNFCC, ‘Essential 
Background - Durban Outcomes’ (UNFCC, 2010) <https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/the-big-
picture/milestones/outcomes-of-the-durban-conference> accessed 8 February 2020. 
103 European Commission, ‘Climate Negotiations’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations_en> accessed 8 February 2020. 
104 UNFCCC, ‘Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
2019) <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification> accessed 8 February 2020. 
The US has notified the UN of its intention to withdraw from the Agreement, which shall take place on 4 
November 2020. ‘Paris Agreement - United Nations Treaty Collection’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&clang=_en#4> accessed 8 February 2020. 
105 The Paris Agreement refers to ‘pre-industrial’ levels, but the exact period is not defined in the Agreement 
or in any other UNFCCC agreements. The IPCC uses the period between 1850-1900 as a baseline in its 
Special Report but it has been suggested that the period 1720-1800 would provide a more accurate ‘pre-
industrial’ baseline. As the interpretation of the baseline period is not crucial for the understanding of this 
paper, it shall be left undefined. (J Rogelj and others, ‘Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the 
Context of Sustainable Development’, Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global 
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening 
the global response to the threat of climate change, (2018) 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Chapter2_Low_Res.pdf>. p 98.) (Ed 
Hawkins and others, ‘Estimating Changes in Global Temperature since the Preindustrial Period’ (2017) 98 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 1841 
<https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/BAMS-D-16-0007.1> accessed 8 February 2020. 1844.).  
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In the Decision through which the Paris Agreement was adopted (Decision 1/CP.21106), the 
COP21 also recognised the role of non-party stakeholders – such as civil society, the private 
sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities – in international 
cooperation in order to “mobilise stronger and more ambitious climate action”. The 
Decision states that non-party stakeholders are welcome to scale up their climate actions and 
they are encouraged to register these actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action 
platform (NAZCA).107 The Decision also urges non-party stakeholders to “support actions 
to reduce emissions and/or to build resilience and decrease vulnerability to the adverse 
effects of climate change” and recognises the role of incentives for emission reduction 
activities (such as domestic policies and carbon pricing).108 The Fashion Industry Charter is 
one of the registered climate actions referred to and encouraged in the Decision.109 
 
3.2.4 The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Corporate Standard  
Target no. 2 of the Charter states that signatories shall commit to certain reductions in their 
GHG emissions in accordance with the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Corporate Standard (the 
“Corporate Standard”).110 The GHG protocol was established in the late 1990’s as a 
collaboration between the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
and the World Resources Institute (WRI), when the aforementioned “recognised the need 
for an international standard for corporate GHG accounting and reporting”.111 Since then, 
the GHG protocol has provided global standards, guidance, tools and training for different 
actors (such as governments, NGO’s and businesses) to “measure and manage” their GHG 
emissions.112 The Corporate Standard establishes requirements and offers guidance for 
corporations and organisations in their GHG emissions inventory – its objectives include e.g. 
helping actors to prepare a true and fair inventory of their emissions, to simplify and reduce 
costs of conducting such an inventory and to increase consistency and transparency of 
 
106 UNFCCC, ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 8 February 2020. 
107 Section 117. ‘NAZCA 2019’ <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/?coopinitid=85> accessed 8 February 
2020. 
108 Sections 134 & 136. 
109 ‘NAZCA 2019’ (n 107). 
110 ‘The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard’ (2004) 
<https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf> accessed 30 March 2020. 
111 ‘About Us Greenhouse Gas Protocol’ <https://ghgprotocol.org/about-us> accessed 30 March 2020. 
112 ibid. 
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emissions accounting and reporting.113 The Corporate Standard includes six other 
greenhouse gases in addition to carbon dioxide.114  
 
The Charter refers to Scope 1, 2 and 3 of the Corporate Standard. Scope 1 includes direct 
GHG emissions, which are emissions occurring from sources that are owned or controlled 
by the company.115 Scope 2 refers to the indirect GHG emissions arising from the company’s 
use of purchased electricity – as these emissions “physically occur at the facility where 
electricity is generated” they are indirect from the viewpoint of the companies purchasing 
said electricity.116 Scope 3, in turn, includes all other indirect GHG emissions. In the 
Corporate Standard, these emissions are described as follows: “Scope 3 emissions are a 
consequence of the activities of the company, but occur from sources not owned or controlled 
by the company.”117 They could arise from, for instance, the use of sold products and services 
as well as the production of purchased materials.118 The contribution to emissions of the 
three scopes described here are illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
113 ‘Corporate Standard Greenhouse Gas Protocol’ <https://ghgprotocol.org/corporate-standard> accessed 
30 March 2020. 
114 These are methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and 
nitrogen trifluoride. ibid. 
115 ‘The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard’ (n 110). p 25. 
116 ibid. 
117 ibid.  
118 ibid.  
Figure 1: Scope 1, 2 & 3 emissions. Source: Greenhouse Gas Protocol: Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) 
Accounting and Reporting Standard’ (2011). p 5. 
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It is significant, that the Charter includes a link to the Corporate Standard, and moreover, 
that the commitment to reduce emissions 30% concerns all three of the abovementioned 
scopes. As can be seen from the illustration above, these scopes cover most, if not all, of the 
possible emission sources of fashion companies. Especially significant in the context of the 
fashion industry is the inclusion of Scope 3 – this way all indirect emissions, such as the 
production of purchased materials (e.g. cotton and other fibres), outsourced activities (e.g. 
the different steps of textile creation and the production of garments) and waste disposal, all 
fall under the Charter’s scope. However, as will be further discussed in chapter 5.6, the 
Charter does not specify which emissions from Scope 3 should be reported. The indirect 
emissions can be essentially anything and without specific requirements, the content and 
extent of reporting is in the hands of the participants themselves. 
 
While some of the targets introduced by the Charter may seem lax, the inclusion of the 
Corporate Standard makes a difference – in addition to helping the signatories to achieve 
the temperature target of the Paris Agreement (target no. 1), it constitutes one of the most 
concrete and quantifiable targets of the Charter. However, the Charter only refers to the 
definition of the three scopes as per the Corporate Standard and makes no mention about the 
accounting or reporting of those emissions. Thus, to help the signatories achieve the 
reduction target, the Charter also includes a separate commitment to “quantify, track and 
publicly report” their GHG emissions in accordance with “standards and best practices of 
measurement and transparency” (target no. 4). These include e.g. Carbon Disclosure 
Project, UN Global Compact and UNEP Climate Initiatives Platform. The Charter itself 
does not specify which of the standards and best practices the signatories should utilise, but 
the Working Group on Decarbonisation and GHG Emission Reduction shall work to “define 
agreed methodologies for calculating and reporting scope 3 GHG emissions”. 119 The 
methods for tracking and reporting shall also be discussed in chapter 5.4. 
  
 
119 UNFCCC, ‘About the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action’ (n 93). The tracking and reporting 
shall be further explored in chapter 5.4. 
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3.3 Summary of the regulatory framework 
As this chapter has hopefully been able to demonstrate, the regulation of the fashion industry 
lies on relatively weak grounds – the EU legislation on waste management being the only 
actual legislative tool which recognises the industry as a major emitter. Other initiatives are 
either local or concern only a certain material or a certain step of the value chain, and 
participation in all of the initiatives is voluntary without the possibility of using any traditional 
methods of enforcement or coercion. The Charter also falls into this category but differs from 
the other examples in a few major ways; first, the Charter was initiated by a widely known 
and accepted international organisation, thus gaining more attention compared to the other 
examples mentioned. Second, it is one of the first initiatives to commit the industry to 
achieving the goals of a globally known and respected convention: the Paris Agreement. 
Third, and as the UNFCCC itself states, the Charter includes “commitments that can go 
beyond anything that any industry has collectively done”.120 
 
The reasons for and the consequences of climate change are extremely vast and far-reaching, 
and the traditional sources of regulation – states, international organisations and bi-
/multilateral cooperation between the aforementioned – alone are not enough to tackle the 
issue. The question no longer is “who is responsible for the mitigation and stopping of climate 
change” but rather “what can each actor do to play their part in the battle against climate 
change”. As a consequence, climate change is increasingly being addressed by other actors, 
such as non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations and even individuals, 
by creating new ways to respond to the issue or by setting rules in areas which are not yet 
covered by legislation. The initiatives described above are an illustrative example of this: they 
include private forms of action as well as public-private cooperation, they address the fashion 
industry value chains in a manner which traditional state-level regulation could not, and they 
include methods of regulation not familiar for the traditional regulators. 
 
The wide array of commitments and initiatives in the fashion industry is certainly auspicious, 
but it also raises further questions. Who are the authorities behind these commitments and 
with what right do they impose these rules upon others? What are the responsibilities of the 
participants and how are the responsibilities defined? What are the reasons behind the 
 
120 UNFCCC, ‘Frequently Asked Questions - Fashion’ <https://unfccc.int/climate-action/sectoral-
engagement/global-climate-action-in-fashion/frequently-asked-questions-fashion#eq-4> accessed 5 April 
2020. 
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voluntary participation of actors in these initiatives and what happens in case of non-
compliance? These questions are relevant when the actors creating the rules are not 
traditional regulators (i.e. states or other public authorities) but are nevertheless in charge – 
that is to say, in the context of global governance. The next chapter shall explore first the 
concept of global governance in more detail, and then move on to defining transnational 
regulation and explaining the different forms in which it is practiced as well as some reasons 
behind it. The intention is not to provide a comprehensive understanding of the concepts 
but rather to offer a suitable perspective of them in light of the context of this paper by 
combining a few different approaches drawn from academic literature.  
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4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 
Questions of the constitution of authority and how it can be practiced as well as the multitude 
of different purposes of transnational regulation are all issues which can (and indeed, have 
been) interpreted differently by different academics. The views explored in this chapter have 
been chosen from the viewpoint of the analysis of the Charter – those viewpoints which are 
able to comprehensively describe the concepts and definitions needed for the analysis shall 
be presented here. 
 
4.1 What is global governance? 
The explicit definition of the term global governance is an ongoing debate. It was first defined 
after the Cold War in 1995 by the Commission on Global Governance as “the sum of the 
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It 
is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated 
and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered 
to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either 
have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.”121 The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
builds on the 1995 Commission’s definition by defining global governance as “a mix of 
bilateral, informal multilateral, and treaty-based relations among states increasingly 
influenced by nonstate actors’ interests and activities”.122 The UN, in turn, has defined the 
term as follows: “global governance encompasses the totality of institutions, policies, norms, 
procedures and initiatives through which States and their citizens try to bring more 
predictability, stability and order to their responses to transnational challenges.”123  
 
The need of global governance usually arises from the fact that there are some issues, which 
affect many (if not all) nations around the globe and are thereby better resolved together – 
such as the threats of terrorism and climate change. Where domestic legislation and 
international regulation are not able to close all the loopholes, different forms of global 
 
121 The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global 
Governance. (Oxford University Press 1995). p 4. 
122 Commission on Global Security Justice & Governance, ‘Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance’ 
(2015). p 9. 
123 Committee for Development Policy, Global Governance and Global Rules for Development in the Post-2015 Era 
(2014). VI. 
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governance might offer more applicable solutions to these global problems.124 This is the 
case with e.g. climate change. States are able to intervene with environmental damage 
resulting from activities inside their territory: they can regulate harmful activities and impose 
sanctions upon non-compliers within their jurisdiction. However, since pollution and other 
environmental damage often cross state borders, the lack of harmonised and/or global 
regulation leads to the possibility of actors (especially large emitters) not bearing the cost for 
the pollution they are responsible for. Another issue might be the abundance of different 
actors participating in harmful actions – in addition to states, emitters might include e.g. 
private companies and international organisations, which are not necessarily under the 
jurisdiction of the state suffering from their actions. The possibility of some actors escaping 
the consequences of their actions due to a jurisdictional issue is an example of a regulatory 
loophole, which can potentially be filled by means of global governance.  
 
Although not explicitly defined, based on the above analysis, three things regarding the 
concept of global governance are clear. It includes the instruments created as well as the 
institutions and actors who create them – thus, transnational regulation, which is further 
explored in chapter 4.2, falls under the definition of global governance. Second, the 
relationships and instruments covered by the term might be either formal or informal in 
nature – meaning that global governance covers an enormous range of different ways of 
organising actions. And lastly, global governance happens between a multitude of actors. 
 
4.1.1 Who are the governors? 
Unlike traditional international relations, global governance does not necessarily happen 
between actors traditionally seen as authorised to engage in such relations on an 
international level – such as states. Rather than being a state-managed affair, global 
governance involves a set of non-state actors – non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), 
multinational corporations (MNC’s) and international organisations (IO’s), for instance. 
Scholte, for example, has identified six different types of global regulatory bodies: 
intergovernmental (e.g. the UN), trans-governmental (e.g. the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development), interregional (e.g. EU relations with other regional 
institutions, such as the Southern Common Market), trans-local (e.g. United Cities and Local 
Governments), private (e.g. World Wildlife Fund and Amnesty International), and public-
 
124 Timothy J Sinclair, Global Governance (Polity Press 2012). p 28. 
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private hybrids (e.g. the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).125 In 
addition to Scholte’s six institutional mechanisms for global governance, Sinclair specifically 
mentions MNC’s as key institutions in the global governance arena.126 According to him, 
MNC’s form a significant part of everyday life around the globe – they are oftentimes 
substantially involved in lobbying governments for better legislation and they actively take 
part in (self-)regulation within the industry.127  
 
Despite the division presented above, global governors can come in any shape or form, as 
long as they can be seen as “authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of 
affecting policy”.128 This definition reveals that global governance cannot, however, be 
exercised by anyone – it raises the ultimate question regarding governance in general: the 
authority of an actor to exercise power over others. The question of authority becomes even 
trickier in the context of global governance, since, as was defined above, the very definition 
of it implies the involvement of non-state actors. From the traditional viewpoint of 
governance, sovereign nation states are the only actors who can exercise authority over 
others. The fact remains, however, that some sort of governance is indeed happening 
transnationally between actors other than states – in order to analyse these governance 
activities, it is crucial that the content of authority is given a closer look. 
 
4.1.2 Questions of authority in global governance 
The previous chapter intended to demonstrate the enormous variety of actors participating 
in global governance – this chapter shall intend to tackle questions regarding the authority 
and legitimacy of those actors. In a traditional setting of practicing international law, actors 
with the authority to engage in legally binding actions conclude legally binding treaties 
between them – this is the case between states and other international entities, such as the 
EU. However, as explained in the previous chapter, this is not how global governance 
happens: there is an abundance of different actors seeking to govern instead of (or in addition 
to) the “traditional” governors. This is where the term private authority becomes useful; 
private authority refers to “situations in which non-state actors make rules or set standards 
 
125 Jan Aart Scholte, Building Global Democracy?: Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance (Cambridge 
University Press 2011). p 11-12. 
126 Sinclair (n 124). p 27. 
127 ibid. 
128 Deborah D Avant, Martha Finnemore and Susan K Sell, ‘Who Governs the Globe?’, Who governs the globe? 
(Cambridge University Press 2010). p 2. 
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that other relevant actors in world politics adopt”.129 Private authority exists, if the governed 
recognise the authority and see them as a legitimate source of authority, and as a result 
consent to their rules and adopt them. 130 This chapter shall first aim to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the term authority: the different elements constituting it, 
what it can be based on and finally the ways in which it can be practiced.  
 
The constitution of authority 
Authority is the “ability to induce deference in others. Authority is thus a social relationship, not a 
commodity; it does not exist in a vacuum. Authority is created by the recognition, even if only tacit or 
informal, of others. Recognising an authority does not mean one always agrees with or likes the 
authority. It does mean, though, that one defers to the authority. Such deference confers power.” 131  
 
Authority is a form of power, which can be described as the ability to make someone do 
something they would not otherwise do. Green describes authority as a “mutually 
constituted” concept, where the actor who exercises authority creates rules, which the 
governed in turn agree to follow. Schmidt also sees power as “an inherent element of 
authority” but argues that authority “cannot be based on egalitarian grounds” and therefore, 
that power is implicit in authority.132 Another element of authority is legitimacy. Bulkeley 
states that authority and legitimacy are inseparable in the context of global governance – this 
is why authority differs from other forms of power, such as coercion, self-interest and 
persuasion.133 Legitimacy can be achieved through uncoerced consent or recognition of the 
authority.134 Recognition happens when the subjects approve of the rules and norms made 
by the authority and perhaps even more importantly, consider them to be right.135 By 
agreeing to follow the rules made by the authority, the subjects consent to the authority – 
thus, authority does not involve coercion, it is a right granted by the subjects.  
 
129 Jessica F Green, Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance 
(Princeton University Press 2013). p 41-43. 
130 ibid.  
131 Avant, Finnemore and Sell (n 128). p 9-10. 
132 Rebecca Schmidt, Regulatory Integration across Borders : Public-Private Cooperation in Transnational Regulation 
(Cambridge University Press 2018). p 38. Schmidt’s analysis is based on the institutional concept of power – 
where institutions and their social practices provide a framework, within which the institution may exercise 
power, which in turn is based on the recognition of others. In addition to providing the institution with the 
ability to exercise power, the institutional framework also sets limits to its arbitrary use. p 39. 
133 Harriet Bulkeley, ‘Governance and the Geography of Authority: Modalities of Authorisation and the 
Transnational Governing of Climate Change’ (2012) 44 Environment and Planning A 2428-2444. p 2429. 
134 Green (n 129). p 40. 
135 Bulkeley (n 133). p 2429. 
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Bases for authority 
In addition to the traditional typology of authority introduced by Weber – the rational-legal, 
traditional and charismatic forms of authority136 – authority has been described as a social 
contract, where order and compliance are being exchanged between the governors and the 
governed.137 In this social context, Bulkeley states that legitimacy can be drawn from a 
variety of factors, such as transparency, accountability or even popularity,138 and authority 
may be derived from e.g. the market, morality, knowledge or issue-specific competence.139 
This chapter shall further explore different bases for authority presented in academic 
literature. 
 
Avant, Finnemore and Sell recognise five bases of authority: institutional, delegated, expert, 
principled and capacity based. Institutional authority is derived from holding a certain office 
in some organisational entity. This form of authority is defined and limited by the rules and 
the purpose of the institution from which they get their authority.140 Delegated authority 
may partly overlap with institution-based authority – it is “authority on loan” from a certain 
authoritative actor (e.g. states).141 Delegated authority is an example of a traditional 
principal-agent relationship. In addition to the ‘traditional’ setting, where states delegate 
authority to e.g. IO’s, authority can also be delegated by an IO to a private actor.142 
 
The institutional and delegated forms of authority pertain to the institutional setting and a 
certain office. Expertise-based authority, on the other hand, is quite the opposite: it derives 
from the actor herself. Expert authority might be combined with other forms of authority – 
for instance when an NGO hires experts to perform certain tasks. Expertise-based authority 
is also limited by the area of expertise in question143 and it lacks the possibility of coercion, 
but it nevertheless has a great impact on shaping the global political economy “in an ever 
more complex, technical and knowledge-driven world”.144 Principled authority can pertain 
 
136 In this setting an actor holds a certain position or office, which gives that actor the right to issue rules and 
laws. David A Lake, ‘Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance’ (2010) 
54 International Studies Quarterly 587 <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-
lookup/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00601.x> accessed 3 March 2020. p 594-595. 
137 ibid. p 596. 
138 Bulkeley (n 133). p 2430. 
139 ibid. p 2430. 
140 Avant, Finnemore and Sell (n 128). p 11. 
141 ibid. p 11-12. 
142 Green (n 129). p 45. 
143 Avant, Finnemore and Sell (n 128). p 12. 
144 Schmidt (n 132). p 41. 
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to both actors and offices – its legitimacy is derived from widely accepted principles, morals 
or values. NGO’s are a typical example of principled authority: other actors trust the moral 
claims made by the NGO’s, due to the “perceived altruism” generally associated with 
NGO’s. Whereas NGO’s are trusted not to have utilitarian motives, profit-driven 
corporations, on the other hand, usually have a harder time convincing others of their 
principled authority.145 Lastly, Avant, Finnemore and Sell mention capacity-based authority, 
which is based on “perceived competence” – the capacity to solve a problem or complete a 
task. The authority of an actor is rarely derived exclusively from the capacity to solve 
problems, but the lack of capacity for effective action may undermine the authority gained 
from other sources.146  
 
In addition to Avant’s, Finnemore’s and Sell’s findings, Green has identified entrepreneurial 
authority. Entrepreneurial authority occurs, for instance, as private certification schemes, 
information-based standards, management standards and industry-wide forms of self-
regulation.147 Along with entrepreneurial authority, Green also identifies authority through 
delegation. The two forms of authority differ e.g. in the timing of consent given by their 
subjects: for entrepreneurial authority it is common that consent is given afterwards, unlike 
in cases of delegated authority.148 Green describes entrepreneurial authority as a process, 
which “culminates in the governed deferring to the governors”.149 
 
Forms of authority practice  
Authority may be used in different ways and the pursued outcomes often vary between 
initiatives. Bulkeley and others have recognised three ways in which authority is usually 
exercised: to “bend” actors’ will towards a certain outcome, to create a “common will” or 
consensus among the participants, and to affect the conduct of others by establishing a 
problem and normalizing certain responses to it.150 To simplify these objectives, authority 
practices can be divided in three categories: consent, consensus or concord.  
 
 
145 Avant, Finnemore and Sell (n 128). p 13. Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders & Laggards: Next-
Generation Environmental Regulation (Greenleaf Pub 2002). p 109. 
146 Avant, Finnemore and Sell (n 128). p 13-14. 
147 Green (n 129). p 94-95.  
148 ibid. p 46. 
149 ibid. p 45. 
150 Harriet Bulkeley and others, Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge University Press 2014). p 
137. 
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In consent-based authority practice the governors aim to get the governed to consent to 
participate to a certain initiative.151 This form of authority practice does not differ greatly 
from state authority – except for the lack of coercive measures. One of the key features of 
consent-based authority is the clear difference between the governors and the governed. 
Nevertheless, the governed are able to quite freely choose whether or not to participate in 
an initiative and oftentimes also how extensively they want to be bound by it. This in turn 
means that one of the most important tasks for the governors is to ensure compliance and 
secure the consent of the governed.152 
 
The second form of authority practice is based on consensus among the participants– these 
initiatives might be seen as clubs, where members collectively decide to govern each other. 
Here the line between the governors and the governed is not as explicit than it is in the 
consent-based initiatives. At the core of these initiatives is a consensus about a certain 
outcome or process, which may bring together a variety of different actors (e.g. cities, 
companies and NGO’s). Another key feature is the role of pre-existing norms and practices, 
around which consensus can be formed. In this form of authority practice the participants 
usually share a deep mutual understanding of a certain ideological discourse (e.g. the 
marketisation of climate), and thus securing the consent of the participants is not as relevant 
as in the consent-based initiatives. 153 
 
The last form of authority practice, concord, is associated with the deeper ways in which pre-
existing norms and practices shape governance – it is a step further from consensus-based 
authority practice.154 Authority practices based on concord oftentimes take consensus for 
granted and thus do not need to spend time on producing and maintaining it. 155  
 
As can be seen from the complexity of this chapter, the concept of authority is not simple. It 
consists of several different elements – power, legitimacy and consent/recognition – it can 
be based on various attributes pertaining to an entity or a person, and it can be exercised in 
different ways depending on the level of understanding among the actors. The next chapter 
shall first introduce the concept of transnational regulation, and then explore the different 
 
151 This is not to be confused with consent as an element of authority (explained in chapter 4.1.2). 
152 Bulkeley and others (n 150). p 138-139. 
153 ibid. p 139-141. 
154 Bulkeley and others describe concord as being closest to ‘the Foucauldian notion of governmentality’. Ibid. 
p 141. 
155 Bulkeley and others (n 150). p 141-142. 
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ways in which the governors – those who have the authority to govern – may regulate matters 
beyond the state. 
 
4.2 What is transnational regulation? 
The term transnational law was first defined by Philip Jessup in 1956: ”I shall use, instead of 
‘international law’, the term transnational law to include all law which regulates actions or 
events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are 
included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”156 The 
traditional distinction between transnational and international law – where international law 
includes treaties between states, customary international law and case law issued by 
international courts, and transnational law includes all other legal arrangements, which cross 
state borders and are not included in the definition of the former – is not necessarily plausible 
in the globalised world we live in today.157 The term has also been described as a set of “legal 
norms that are exported and imported across borders, and that involve transnational 
networks and international and regional institutions that help to construct and convey the 
legal norm within a field of law”.158 In this point of view the focus is on the production, rather 
than application, of norms in the transnational context.159  Bulkeley and others have stated 
that “transnational phenomena are those that bridge, operate or extend across the 
boundaries of states” and that “transnational phenomena, by definition, involve non-state or 
substate actors”.160 
 
Since most of the initiatives discussed in this paper are not instruments of ‘law’ per se but are 
nevertheless referred to as some other form of regulation, it is important to clarify what is 
meant by the term in this paper. The simplified definition of regulation is “the act of steering 
behaviour deliberately towards a desirable goal”.161 A more comprehensive approach would 
be to describe regulation as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of 
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
 
156 Philip C Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press 1956). p 2. 
157 Veerle Heyvaert, Transnational Environmental Regulation and Governance: Purpose, Strategies and Principles 
(Cambridge University Press 2018). p 28-29. 
158 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge University Press 2009). p 5. 
159 Heyvaert (n 157). p 30. 
160 Bulkeley and others (n 150). p 5. 
161 Heyvaert (n 157). p 26. 
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information-gathering and behaviour-modification".162 And further, it could be defined as 
”the deliberate exercise of influence on a target’s behaviour (designed either to stabilise or 
modify this behaviour) performed with a certain degree of authority and persistence.” One 
example of deliberate would be a group of actors adopting instruments and practices that 
modify behaviour and explicitly identify the objectives of the action taken. 163 
 
All of the definitions above have something useful to build on – regulation shall thus refer to 
the processes of establishing norms and any activity aimed at influencing others’ behaviour, 
which is exercised with some sort of authority. The activities referred to as regulation shall 
not, in this instance, include enforcement – issues regarding this matter shall be analysed 
separately. Taking into consideration the context of and issue areas covered in this paper, 
the term transnational is likewise most useful when understood broadly: hence, in this paper 
it shall cover border-crossing regulation by non-state actors and the networks they form.  
 
The next chapters shall explore transnational regulation in a more specific context and 
analyse in more detail the different reasons for engaging in transnational environmental 
regulation. 
 
4.2.1 Forms and purposes of transnational environmental regulation 
Transnational environmental regulation (TER) can happen between public actors (such as 
states and public authorities) and private actors (such as corporations) by the formation of 
different types of relationships.164 The public forms of TER can be addressed either to other 
public authorities or to the private sector. Public/public TER is developed by and addressed 
to public authorities.165 Public/private TER in turn is developed by the state or other public 
authorities and addressed to the private sector – such as the EU REACH legislation and 
many of the UN programmes (e.g. the Global Compact).166 In public/private TER initiatives 
the participation is voluntary, and the initiative is arranged and administered by a 
transnational public entity on behalf of its signatories.  
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Just as with public forms of regulation, private sector initiatives can also be addressed to 
either the private or the public sector, although private/public regulation is quite 
uncommon. In some (rare) cases private governance may steer the behaviour of public 
authorities – this happens “when public authorities incorporate, accede to or are indirectly 
annexed in private/private TER”.167 More common, however, is private regulation 
addressed to the private sector. The usual methods of private/private regulation include 
standard setting and certification, and participation is usually sectoral (i.e. within an industry) 
rather than jurisdictional. Private/private TER is therefore essentially self-regulation within 
an industry, where the authority is informal, and the participation of corporations can be 
seen as a form of corporate social responsibility.168 Lastly, there is hybrid TER. The term 
hybrid is used, when a governance network is so complex that it does not fall under neither 
public nor private forms – the hybrid network can be referred to as a ‘regime complex’.169 
 
There are several reasons as to why both public and private actors engage in transnational 
regulation. For instance, Lipschutz and Fogel have identified three incentives behind such 
private initiatives; normative, functional and instrumental.170 Normative incentives refer to 
the sense of e.g. justice, equity and indigenous rights as reasons behind an initiative. 
Functional incentives concern the development of protection and conservation programs, 
and instrumental incentives refer to the benefits arising from certification or approval. 171 
Heyvaert, in turn, has identified five main reasons to participate in TER: collective action, 
trade facilitation, substitute, risk management and enhancement TER. This chapter shall 
follow the aforementioned categorisation, and it shall also be utilised in the further analysis 
of the Charter in chapter 5.172 
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Collective Action – Public/public 
The objects of environmental protection are public goods, which are mostly non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable within and among states. From the viewpoint of national regulation, the 
protection of these goods encounters some major obstacles: pollution crossing state borders, 
different states having established different (and often incompatible) environmental 
legislation, the risk of environmentally harmful production being moved to states with less 
stringent measures on environmental protection and the risk of freeriding by states with less 
stringent environmental legislation. To overcome the abovementioned risks, states and 
public authorities can cooperate and establish “transboundary environmental regimes”.173 
An example of collective action TER is the UNFCCC. In short, the purpose of collective 
action TER is the effective regulation of global public goods. However, standards set forth 
by collective action initiatives are usually shallow, the regulatory output is modest and slow 
to change, and decision making is often purely expertise based. Over time collective action 
initiatives tend to include both voluntary and binding instruments.174 
 
Trade facilitation – Public/public, public/private 
Most of the time the motives behind regulation are not exclusively related to the protection 
of the environment – this is where trade facilitation TER arises from. It is often adopted in 
situations where incompatible national environmental regulation sets obstacles for the free 
trade of goods (e.g. the EU Ecolabel). In short, the aim of trade facilitation TER is the 
environmental protection and market liberalization through harmonisation, which is usually 
achieved via the creation of product standards.175 
 
Substitute – Private/private, private/public 
Substitute TER occurs when the state is unable or unwilling to create acceptable 
environmental regulation (one motivation might be the states’ inability to regulate beyond 
its borders). An example of substitute TER is the UN Global Compact – a UN-led voluntary 
initiative, which aims to motivate the private sector to engage in more sustainable activities 
within their corporation. This also represents a common form of substitute TER: an NGO- 
or IO-led initiative, where the NGO/IO either takes control of the initiative or works 
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together with the other participants. Substitute TER works through a variety of instruments, 
e.g. standard setting, audits, certifications, codes of conduct, principle-based regulation and 
guidance.176 The main issue with substitute TER is the lack of implementation and 
enforcement powers. The participation in and the compliance with substitute TER initiatives 
is essentially in the hands of the participants themselves, which affects their strength as 
regulatory instruments and creates an authority deficit. This vulnerability and lack of 
authority may be compensated by e.g. linking the initiative to a binding national or 
international commitment (to establish a baseline for performance) and by seeking the 
support of public interest groups – both of which enhance the credibility of the initiative. 
Substitute TER initiatives may also use other ways to boost their credibility – for instance, 
using trademarks, building coalitions with different actors (states, NGO’s, MNC’s etc.) and 
using consumer power in the absence of traditional means of coercion.177 
 
Risk management – Private/private 
Risk management TER is usually adopted in situations, where actors want to avoid the 
possible negative consequences of under-regulation. It can take the form of e.g. self-
regulation or cooperation with other initiatives. Risk management TER, like substitute TER, 
is based on voluntary requirements and occurs mainly via standardisation, auditing and 
certification. The issues with risk management TER are also similar to those with substitute 
TER: there might be a lack of credibility of the initiative, the self-regulatory regime might 
not actually be maintained, and they lack enforcement methods. Risk management TER 
might also incentivise anti-competitive behaviour – the line is thin between working towards 
fulfilling the public interest and the pursuit of private interests. The credibility challenges 
related to risk management TER arise mainly from the nature of self-regulation within an 
industry, since the motives for it are (believed to be) mostly utilitarian (this will be discussed 
more thoroughly in chapter 4.3). In time risk management TER, if successful, may push 
states to create regulation similar to the private initiatives. 178 
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Enhancement – Hybrid 
The focus in this form of TER is in enhancing the effect of existing regulation by joining 
forces with other regulators. Reasons for working together can be e.g. to achieve more cost-
effective practices, sharing the expenses of regulation, sharing expertise and exchanging 
information. Enhancement TER can be initiated either by participants or they can be led by 
a transnational entity (such as organs of the UN or EU institutions). The aims of such a 
network might be more general, for instance facilitating the sharing of information and 
motivating learning between participants. The aims can also include e.g. specific targets, 
which can be more ambitious than the targets set out in international treaties or via national 
legislation. The participants are often given a lot of freedom in deciding their level of 
contribution to the initiative.179 
 
This chapter has hopefully been able to demonstrate the complexity of the concepts of global 
governance and transnational regulation. The reason behind the increase of global 
governance initiatives – especially in the context of this paper – is quite simple: ”coercion 
and sanction are costly mechanisms of control, quite unsuited for regulating activities that 
require any measure of creativity or enthusiasm”.180 In other words, different forms of global 
governance are able to offer solutions that states could probably never provide, and while 
states may have the upper hand in enforcement and coercion, global governors are far more 
able when it comes to e.g. leadership and creativity.181 This is essential especially when 
addressing a formerly unknown or otherwise exceptionally complex issue, such as the climate 
change – or an industry with activities around the globe. 
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4.3 Self-regulation 
When talking about the increase in transnational regulation, people often refer to initiatives 
in the private sector. As established in the previous chapter, private/private T(E)R is 
essentially self-regulation within an industry; self-regulation happens when private sector 
actors voluntarily bind themselves to certain rules. These rules can e.g. go beyond the current 
regulatory requirements or establish completely new standards for industries/areas for which 
government regulation is lacking. All self-regulatory initiatives need some consensus on the 
content of the rules and some expertise in their implementation.182 Where consensus is deep, 
it is more likely that self-regulation will be developed and implemented. The role of 
leadership is also crucial – when industry leaders establish certain “best practices” they may 
influence or even pressure other industry actors or their business partners to act in conformity 
with these practices. 183  
 
Strengths and weaknesses of self-regulation 
Voluntary approaches, such as industry self-regulation, can offer certain valuable things that 
government regulation perhaps cannot; they can e.g. encourage collective learning, 
distribute valuable information and build consensus among participants.184 Industry self-
regulation also offers advantages for governments – these include influencing the behaviour 
of an industry without getting actively involved and using the resources of the industry actors 
instead of government resources. Self-regulatory instruments also allow for forms of 
regulation which would not be possible on the government level.185 There might also be 
some political advantages in choosing self-regulation; self-regulation allows the government 
to say that a certain issue is being regulated without having to take responsibility for the 
regulation.186 From the industry’s point of view a self-regulatory scheme may raise the 
barriers to enter the industry, thus creating economic benefits for the existing actors and 
participants to the initiative. 187 One of the major advantages of self-regulation is its flexibility; 
when circumstances change, the rules can be quickly adjusted if necessary. There are also 
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fewer restraints in self-regulatory schemes, relating to e.g. budget and personnel control.188 
In addition, some argue that compliance is higher with self-regulatory instruments where the 
participants have had the chance to develop the rules themselves and they understand the 
need for those rules as well as their targets. 189  
 
The abovementioned advantages of self-regulation represent only one side of the coin; there 
are also multiple issues with and limitations to the use of self-regulatory initiatives. In contrast 
to government regulation, which is seen as impartial and fair and is thought to protect the 
public interest, self-regulation is not always seen as capable of achieving those objectives.190 
This concern arises from the reasoning behind the decision to participate in self-regulatory 
initiatives, which shall be discussed further on in this chapter. Another concern is the 
possibility of the controlling participants to dominate the self-regulatory regime and pursue 
their own interests rather than the public interest.191 In addition, self-regulation may lead to 
under-regulation; as will be demonstrated later on, one reason behind participating in a 
voluntary self-regulation scheme might be the avoidance of stricter government regulation. 
Another reason for under-regulation in a self-regulatory scheme might be the lack of 
personnel and expertise on the matter.192 Finally, as opposed to e.g. government legislation, 
self-regulatory regimes are not subject to certain accountability mechanisms; tools such as 
ministerial responsibility, judicial review, oversight and transparency of decision-making are 
lacking in self-regulatory initiatives and regimes.193  
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Forms of self-regulation  
“Self-regulation occurs when those regulated design and implement and perhaps even enforce the rules 
themselves.”194  
 
Self-regulation, too, comes in many sizes and colours. This chapter shall present a few 
different categorisations based on their usefulness in the context of this paper, taking into 
account the nature of the analysis presented in chapter 5. The aim is to present a theoretical 
framework for instruments similar to the Charter; voluntary instruments with little or no 
influence from public authorities, conducted between industry representatives and, 
furthermore, which do not include any (obvious) methods for sanctioning. 
 
Gunningham and Sinclair have researched voluntary arrangements in the field of 
environmental protection and found three prevalent forms of voluntary commitments; 
unilateral commitments, public voluntary programmes and negotiated agreements. All of 
these represent different forms of informal regulation within or by an industry.195 Unilateral 
commitments are instruments initiated by companies or industry associations without any 
involvement of public authorities, where the targets are set, and their fulfilment monitored, 
by the initiators themselves. Public voluntary programmes are typically initiated by a public 
authority and private actors then adhere to the rules set by the public authority, whereas 
negotiated agreements are bargained between public authorities and an industry.196 For the 
purposes of this paper, unilateral commitments shall be further explored and analysed here. 
 
Unilateral commitments have been further divided into two forms. First form of 
commitments occurs as signing up to an environmental charter, which aims to raise the level 
of corporate environmental performance across an industry without introducing any specific 
performance targets. The second approach includes commitments developed by an industry 
association and aim to reach the industry as a whole – i.e. industry-wide forms of self-
regulation, such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care initiative.197 Even though 
unilateral commitments are purely private sector instruments , public authorities can support 
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and encourage the initiatives by e.g. publicising them.198 Industry self-regulation also has its 
issues, some of which are especially characteristic for these forms of collective initiatives. One 
example is the threat of freeriding, where a participant seeks to claim the benefits associated 
with the membership of such an initiative without fulfilling any obligations.199 Freeriding is 
possible mainly because these voluntary industry self-regulatory instruments include no 
methods of enforcement or sanctioning.200 Despite their issues and the lack of binding 
measures, voluntary industry-wide self-regulation has great potential; it can “build an 
industry morality” and “institutionalise responsibility”.201  
 
Priest has also explored different forms of self-regulation and has identified five prevalent 
models; voluntary codes of conduct, statutory self-regulation, firm-defined regulation, 
supervised self-regulation and regulatory self-management.202 All of the aforementioned 
models, save for voluntary codes of conduct, include some level of government involvement. 
For the purposes of this paper, these models shall not be further explored here – the main 
interest shall be the voluntary codes of conduct and their characteristics. Voluntary codes of 
conduct are established voluntarily usually by a contract. They have little or none 
involvement from the public, but they might have a public representative on a committee (if 
such a committee is established). Voluntary codes of conduct usually do not include any 
methods of auditing compliance or ensuring accountability towards third parties. The rules 
are made by the participants themselves and are based on consensus among them. 
Adjudication methods and sanctioning are oftentimes lacking, and freeriding might become 
a problem.203 
 
“The source of power to initiate and enforce a code is thus found within the industry” 204 
 
The different forms of self-regulation can be analysed through certain categories; following 
Priest’s research, these categories are efficiency, effectiveness, openness, fairness and 
accountability. Efficiency refers to achieving regulatory objectives at the lowest possible cost. 
Voluntary codes of conduct include several elements contributing to their efficiency, such as 
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their flexibility as instruments resulting in easy adaptation to changing circumstances, and 
the use of expertise in their development. Part of the voluntary codes’ efficiency comes from 
their low cost to governments, since costs are largely borne by the participants (and 
transferred to customers). The creation of and the participation in voluntary codes may, 
however, induce anti-competitive behaviour. 205 
 
The second category, effectiveness, embodies the achievement of regulatory objectives, 
incentives for compliance and methods for enforcement.206 Voluntary codes can be tailored 
to suit the needs of a specific industry better than government regulation, which is especially 
relevant in situations where a certain problem has not been regulated before. A voluntary 
code, if proven effective, may become the industry best-practice. On the other hand, 
voluntary codes may prove to be ineffective due to the lack of incentives for compliance and 
methods for enforcement. They might also prove to be ineffective if only a few industry 
representatives participate in them. 207  
 
Third, openness refers to the accessibility and transparency of the voluntary code. As the 
development of voluntary codes usually happens between participants and there is little or 
no involvement of the public, there is often room for improvement in terms of transparency. 
However, transparency can be increased by involving public interest groups or even states, 
and by publicising the code and its contents – the more representatives of different 
stakeholder groups participate in the process of developing a code, the more interests can be 
represented in it.208 The fourth category, fairness, refers to the equitable assignment of duties, 
rights, benefits and obligations. Voluntary codes, which typically have no enforcement 
methods other than e.g. the use of logos or membership, are “governed by rules of fairness 
in dealing with members”, but members of the public cannot demand dispute settlement 
among the participants. 209 
 
Finally, there is the question of accountability. In the case of voluntary codes, the participants 
are usually accountable to other participants and the code is enforced through membership 
contracts.210 Depending on the relationship of the code with government regulation – 
 
205 ibid. p 278. 
206 ibid. p 279. 
207 ibid. p 279. 
208 ibid. p 280. 
209 ibid. p 281. 
210 ibid. p 282. 
  47 
whether its instead of or in addition to legislation – the issue of accountability is viewed 
differently. When the voluntary code is intended to substitute government regulation, 
mechanisms of ensuring accountability are lacking. When the intention is to complement 
government regulation, however, voluntary codes can provide additional measures for 
accountability; such as peer pressure and comprehensive compliance systems. 211  
 
Priest’s categorisation is not the only way to analyse the different forms of self-regulation. 
Another way to evaluate voluntary approaches is to analyse them in terms of legitimacy, 
rigor, accountability and complementarity.212  These categories are somewhat similar to the 
division presented by Priest – accountability, for example, refers to the independence and 
transparency of a regime.213 Legitimacy refers to the participation of key stakeholders 
throughout the entire process of standard setting, monitoring and enforcement. 214 Rigidness 
refers to e.g. the measurability of the standards and whether they meet or exceed the 
requirements of legislation.215 And finally, the complementarity of a regime concerns the 
relationship between the regime and state regulation; whether the nongovernmental system 
intends to complement or replace government regulation. 216 The objective of this kind of 
analysis is to determine whether an initiative can in fact complement existing regulation and 
fulfil regulatory loopholes, and whether the initiative truly is effective. 
 
Transparency and accountability issues  
As the voluntary approaches described above cannot resort to traditional means of ensuring 
compliance and accountability, they must create other kinds of methods and incentives. 
There are several methods to enhance accountability; e.g. opening meetings and procedures 
to the public, as well as engaging independent auditors or reviewers.217 Establishing a 
committee to manage the administration of the instrument is also an option, preferably by 
including members representing different stakeholder groups in order to adequately address 
the varying needs and viewpoints of all those involved. This way the instrument becomes 
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more transparent and is more likely to be accepted.218 Public reporting and evaluation are 
also key tools in improving accountability in self-regulatory schemes. Reporting not only 
draws the public’s attention to a participant’s performance, but the results give the 
abovementioned committee (or other administrative body) the possibility to identify issues 
and address them to increase compliance. 219 In the absence of government coercion and 
sanctions, some self-regulatory instruments rely on third-party oversight. The external 
evaluation of independent third parties is more credible than self-monitoring by the 
participants themselves. 220  
 
Despite the abundance of options to enhance accountability, many self-regulatory schemes 
mainly rely on informal enforcement measures, such as “naming and shaming”.221 
Reputational pressure is thought to be effective enough to ensure compliance 222 – however, 
in order to tackle the issue of freeriding (and hence, greenwashing), an effective complaints-
mechanism and commercially significant sanctioning is crucial. The complaints and 
sanctioning mechanisms should be reinforced by spreading knowledge about the initiative; 
the attention drawn to a “naming and shaming” campaign will increase its effectiveness by 
affecting the actor’s reputation.223 Especially when the initiative in question concerns issues 
of ethical behaviour, compliance with it is to some extent enforced by peer pressure and 
reputational pressure – reputation can be an effective tool in informal sanctioning and 
ensuring compliance.224 Peer pressure is an especially significant tool in an industry, where 
the reputation of one affects the reputation of all.225 Peer pressure is effective in certain 
situations, but it needs a “consensus of interests” in order to work. The effect of peer pressure 
may disappear e.g. when only a small group of actors dominate the self-regulatory regime or 
when the number of actors in the industry grows rapidly, and the participation in the regime 
is not mandatory.226 It has also been suggested that in order for a self-regulatory instrument 
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to become credible and effective, government support in creating regulation and ensuring 
enforcement is essential.227 
 
When to resort to self-regulation?  
Self-regulation is a viable alternative to government regulation in an industry with only a few 
actors, which are preferably large and have already existed for some time. Some also suggest 
that voluntary codes might thrive in industries with “rapidly changing or advanced 
technology”, where companies are more likely to comply with e.g. environmental regulation. 
228 For a self-regulatory regime to work, the participating actors should share certain core 
interests to be able to agree on rules and be willing to enforce them. In the ideal situation, 
according to Priest, the opinion of peers as well as the consumers and public should be 
paramount to the participants. It is also crucial that the majority of the industry is 
participating in the regime and that the industry has sufficient resources to maintain and 
develop it. In the absence of government resources, the availability of expertise is also a must. 
229 In short, self-regulatory schemes are most effective when non-compliance can be 
punished, there are dispute settlement mechanisms in place and consumers value 
compliance.230 
 
Why participate in voluntary self-regulation? 
There are multiple reasons why a private actor might want to engage in voluntary self-
regulatory schemes. Especially for MNC’s and other actors aiming for financial gain, reasons 
behind participation might be profit-driven. A major motivator in this case would be 
resource efficiency – corporations can often cut down on emissions simply by being more 
resource-efficient.231  By participating in voluntary schemes, a company might also be able 
to reduce certain risks,232 such as the threat of regulation (national/international), public 
activism resulting in negative attention and losing the competitive position of a company.233 
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One element of the risk management approach is regulatory avoidance.234 Private forms of 
governance might become cheaper for corporations compared to expensive (and mandatory) 
government regulation. Companies might also anticipate government regulation in the near 
future, and act before the government regulation comes into force – thereby gaining so called 
first-mover advantage.235 By acting in advance of government regulation, actors might set 
expectations for the future regulation and industry standards, and avoid the costs of 
implementing new rules in the future.236 A key aspect in the decision to join in a voluntary 
initiative to avoid government regulation, is the fact that in transnational operations actors 
may face the threat of regulation from multiple different sources; the actor’s home state may 
regulate the actor’s activities both home and abroad, and there is also a possibility of 
international regulation. While it might be less complicated for the actor to leave the 
regulation to the state and other public entities, the processes of creating hard international 
law are often slow and highly political, which is why some actors might prefer engaging in 
self-regulatory schemes instead.237 
 
The regulatory avoidance approach regards the actor’s attitude towards government 
regulation – thus, it focuses on the relationship between the actor and the public sector. 
However, the public sector is not the only cause for concern for actors; the private sector 
plays an increasingly important role in today’s globalised society. One major incentive for 
participation in voluntary regulation and the key explanation behind the rise of industry self-
regulation is reputational pressure.238 The reputation of a company affects all of its 
relationships – retail and corporate customers as well as investors, employees and other 
stakeholders. 239 
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“In short, anything a company does anywhere in the world can affect its reputation everywhere in the 
world. Reputation has become the cornerstone of both investor confidence and public trust. What 
happens to a company’s reputation therefore has an increasingly direct impact on its relationships with 
everyone from governments and regulators to customers, employees and investors.”240  
 
The different stakeholder groups of a corporation have power over its behavioural choices, 
and the reputational risks arising from unethical behaviour are simply not worth it.241 There 
have been examples of successful activist group campaigns aimed at e.g. boycotting a certain 
company or raising awareness of a company’s unethical behaviour, which have led actors to 
take reputational aspects of doing business more seriously.242 Reputational pressure matters 
especially in initiatives, which create a “club effect” among the participants;  actors might 
join the club for the reputational benefits arising from being associated with an 
environmentally responsible initiative,243 or they might join in order to avoid being shamed 
or sanctioned for not participating.244 
 
The reasons behind an individual actor’s decision to participate in a voluntary self-regulatory 
instrument are diverse – without extensive empirical research one cannot conclude any 
definite motives for participation. The next chapter shall dive into the initiatives in the 
fashion industry and analyse the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action in more detail, 
based on the theory presented in this chapter. 
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5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, transnational regulation can occur in many different 
forms, the range of possible global governors is enormous, and they exercise authority via a 
number of methods. The fashion industry has multiple examples of different forms of 
transnational regulation by different kind of governors who exercise varying sorts of 
authority. For instance, while not exactly a fashion industry initiative, the EU circular 
economy legislative package does affect the industry greatly (at least within the EU). The EU 
and the legislative package, however, cannot be described as a form of global governance – 
the EU’s authority derives from member state delegation and is generally quite widely 
accepted as equally legitimate as state authority. Nevertheless, it contributes to the range of 
initiatives concerning the fashion industry. 
 
Another example is the GFA 2020 commitment, which represents a very different kind of 
industry-wide initiative. The GFA is a non-profit organisation, which describes itself as “a 
thought leadership and advocacy organisation focusing on industry collaboration and 
public-private cooperation”.245 The GFA’s authority could be described as a mix of 
entrepreneurial and principled authority – as a non-profit organisation they advocate for 
ethical behaviour in the field of fashion and by creating initiatives they engage in industry 
self-regulation. The commitment, in turn, could be seen as a form of substitute or risk 
management TER, where the industry itself decides to adopt certain standards / rules in 
order to either avoid the negative consequences arising from (possible) government 
regulation or to fulfil loopholes left by inadequate government regulation. The issues with 
the GFA 2020 commitment are the same as in any self-regulatory schemes – voluntary 
participation, lack of enforcement methods and credibility issues. Indeed, according to the 
2019 status report of the commitment, 15 of the 90 signatories had not met the minimum 
requirements.246 
 
In this paper the main focus is on the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action, which is 
also a private sector instrument intended to govern the actions of the signatories. The process 
for the initiation of the Charter was twofold: first, the UN Climate Change called for the 
 
245 ‘Global Fashion Agenda - About Us’ <https://globalfashionagenda.com/about-us/> accessed 8 February 
2020. 
246 ‘Global Fashion Agenda - 2020 Commitment’ <https://globalfashionagenda.com/commitment/#> 
accessed 8 February 2020. 
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industry representatives to take action in mitigating their environmental impacts throughout 
the industry, and second, the signatories then proceeded to establish targets and rules for 
themselves via the Charter. This division shall also guide the structure of the following 
chapters: questions relating to the authority of the UN Climate Change shall be covered first, 
and the questions arising from the Charter in connection with the theory of industry self-
regulation shall be addressed after.  
 
5.1 Questions about authority in the Charter 
As one of the most widely-known and accepted global governors, the authority of the UN 
and its different organs has been quite thoroughly analysed in the academic literature (some 
of the work has been referred to in this paper, see e.g. chapter 4.1). In the case of the Charter, 
the authority of the UN Climate Change could be based on a few different attributes of the 
organisation: their “perceived altruism” constituting principled authority, and the possibility 
of the organisation using experts to perform certain tasks, thus constituting expert 
authority.247 The UNFCCC is also the parent treaty of the Paris Agreement,248 which in turn 
is linked to the Charter – thus, the authority of the UN Climate Change in initiating the 
Charter might also derive from its previous actions, and the fact that it has been considered 
legitimate in the past via e.g. the Paris Agreement.  
 
When looking at the Charter as a self-regulatory instrument, the more pressing question is 
the authority base of the signatories. In this case, it could be described as entrepreneurial authority 
(see chapter 4.1.2), which often occurs as e.g. industry-wide forms of self-regulation 
(including situations where a few industry representatives create a set of standards for them 
and for other industry representatives to follow).249 This is also the case with the Charter; the 
43 original signatories established the targets and rules, and then invited others to join their 
cause. Thus, by establishing those rules the original signatories acted as governors. However, 
they also intend to follow the rules and achieve the targets themselves – which is where the 
line between the governors and the governed gets blurred. As the signatories use their 
entrepreneurial authority to collectively govern each other they form a kind of club, where 
the difference between the governors and the governed is not always clear (as demonstrated 
 
247 See chapter 4.1.2.  
248 UNFCCC, ‘About the Secretariat’ <https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat> accessed 31 
March 2020. 
249 Green (n 129). p 46. 
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above). The signatories might share a mutual understanding regarding a certain outcome or 
process, which is why they are brought together in this initiative. In this case the desired 
outcome is the mitigation of climate change.  
 
The bases for the UN Climate Change’s and the signatories’ authority might be different, 
but the form in which they practice that authority in connection with the Charter is quite 
similar. That is to say, all the participants aim for the same outcome, thus constituting an 
example of consensus-based authority practice. One of the key features in this sort of 
authority practice is the role of pre-existing norms and practices, around which consensus 
can be formed. In the case of the Charter, the pre-existing norms could refer to the 
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. In consensus-based authority practice the consent to a 
certain outcome usually exists prior to any action being taken due to the deep mutual 
understanding which exists among the parties of a certain ideological discourse. In the case 
of the Charter, it is clear that the signatories along with the UN Climate Change share a 
mutual understanding of the necessity of protecting the environment and mitigating climate 
change. Thus, the UN Climate Change used its (principled) authority to unite the signatories, 
who already shared an understanding of the fashions industry’s negative impacts on the 
climate and realised that it should have a more active role in the fight against climate change.  
 
The role of the UN Climate Change 
As was established, the UN Climate Change used its’ legitimate authority to initiate the 
commitment, but what kind of role does it have in the implementation, maintenance and 
development of the Charter? The UNFCC itself represents collective action TER, where the 
main purpose is the effective regulation of global public goods.250 Collective action TER is 
initiated by a public sector actor and is addressed to the public sector – hence, the Charter 
does not fit the description. The Charter is an example of public/private TER – initiated by 
a public entity and addressed to the private sector. Furthermore, and as mentioned before, 
in public/private forms of TER the participation is voluntary, and the initiative is arranged 
and administered by a transnational public entity on behalf of its signatories.251 Indeed, as 
can be seen from the Charter, the role of the UN Climate Change in the fulfilment of the 
Charter is exactly that: 
 
250 See chapter 4.2.1. 
251 See chapter 4.2.1. 
  55 
 
UN Climate Change is committed to facilitate and coordinate, within its resources 
and mandates and as part of its work on Global Climate Action, the work undertaken 
by Signatories as part of the fashion industry’s response to UNFCCC Global Climate 
Action.252 
 
UN Climate Change will facilitate the work by:  
a. Supporting the delivery of the Working Groups to the extent that they are 
within UN Climate Change’s existing resources and mandates;  
b. Maintaining a list of Signatories and their participation in working groups;  
c. Facilitating regular online calls and meetings as may be necessary among 
Signatories; 
d. Organising an annual face-to-face meeting with all Signatories to take stock 
of progress, share lessons learned, and discuss and agree on work to be done 
in the next year. Signatories will be invited to host the meeting on a rotational 
basis and attendees will bear their own costs of attendance;  
e. Coordinating external communication activities by the Signatories;  
f. Presenting and explaining the work of the Signatories to other entities and 
organisations, as needed to facilitate delivery of work by the Signatories; 253 
 
The above examples leave little room for interpretation – the role of the UN Climate Change 
is purely administrative. Nevertheless, the fact that the Charter functions under a widely 
known and authoritative international organisation benefits the signatories by establishing a 
stronger sense of authority for the initiative and by enhancing its credibility. By being under 
the auspices of the UN Climate Change, the initiative also gets more attention, as was seen 
in the COP25. Martin Frick, Senior Director Policy and Coordination at UN Climate 
Change, applauded the fashion industry’s representatives for taking action against climate 
change by joining the Charter, and stated that the fashion industry is a great example of 
social norm creating: “fashion works like no other industry with the perception of what’s 
right, what’s cool, what’s the thing that people should wear, and that’s an always evolving 
colourful, interesting, creative thing. And if we can have, not only the industry in itself, 
looking inside into your own value chains, in the electricity that you buy, in the water 
 
252 Modalities of Work, Section 1. 
253 Modalities of Work, Section 15. 
  56 
consumption -- if you use your sparkle, the fascination that people have with beauty to make 
this green agenda something that people aspire to, and not a backwards agenda -- it is the 
thing to do.” 254 Which raises the following questions; what are the reasons behind a 
voluntary initiative like the Charter and why do actors want to participate in it? 
 
5.2 Reasons behind the Charter and motives for participation 
While the Charter quite clearly represents a public/private form of TER, the purpose behind 
the initiative is a more complex issue. Chapter 4.2.1 introduced different purposes of TER 
– one of which was the use of TER in the case of a states’ unwillingness or inability to create 
acceptable environmental regulation. A common form of this kind of substitute TER is an 
NGO-/IO-led initiative, where the NGO/IO either takes control of the initiative or works 
together with the other participants – like the Charter. A substitute TER initiative, especially 
when led by an NGO/IO, might occur as e.g. principle-based regulation. 
 
A short analysis of the preamble of the Charter reveals the ultimate motive for the initiative: 
the consensus about the fact that certain, environmentally harmful activities require 
regulation. This can be seen in many instances in the Charter, e.g.: 
 
”the goals agreed in the Paris Agreement translate to reaching climate neutrality 
in the second half of the twenty-first century. The fashion industry, as a major 
global player, needs to take an active part in contributing to the realisation of 
these goals”255 
 
”current solutions and business models will not be sufficient to deliver on the 
current climate agenda. Fashion industry needs to embrace a deeper, more 
systemic change and scale low-carbon solutions; ”256 
 
”the fashion industry stakeholders have a role to play in reducing climate 
emissions resulting from their operations, with an awareness that the majority of 
 
254 The whole webcast can be seen at UNFCCC, ‘Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action: One Year 
after Its Launch’, COP25 (2019) <https://unfccc-cop25.streamworld.de/webcast/fashion-industry-charter-
for-climate-action-one-ye> accessed 7 April 2020. 
255 Preamble, Section 3.  
256 Preamble, Section 6. 
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climate impact within the industry lies in manufacturing of products and 
materials; ”257 
 
There is a widespread understanding globally that MNC’s have responsibilities concerning 
other stakeholder groups than their shareholders – that is to say, “those who are affected by 
their activities”.258 The Charter is not the only instance where a certain activity is deemed 
underregulated; Cragg notes that there is a general consensus on the international level about 
certain commercial activities that require regulation or standard setting, as well as the need 
of protection against unwanted harm in certain areas (e.g. human rights and the 
environment).259 Besides the general consensus that the actions of MNC’s need to be 
regulated, there are other reasons for encouraging self-regulation. Some argue that 
international hard law (international conventions etc.) cannot be trusted to “bring about 
needed changes to ensure global sustainability”. This lack of trust is mostly due to the 
inefficiency of the processes of international hard law and the lack of enforcement methods 
on the global level – thereby, it is argued that better results may be achieved through 
international standards and other voluntary programmes.260 Furthermore, the regulation of 
environmental and other issues relating to the concept of sustainable development has 
already increasingly been focusing on the collaboration between governments and industries 
in order to ensure the protection of the environment as well as to secure economic growth 
and job creation.261  
 
Thus, the most plausible reasons behind an initiative like this are 1) the consensus that the 
fashion industry, as a major emitter of GHG’s, should somehow be regulated and 2) due to 
the inability or the inefficiency of states and other traditional governors to regulate such 
activity, the regulation has to be carried out by some other global actor – in this case, by the 
UN Climate Change.  
 
At the panel discussions at COP25, one of the issues discussed was indeed the role of the 
fashion industry in the fight against climate change. Hans Peter Lankes, Vice President of 
 
257 Preamble, Section 7. 
258 Wesley Cragg, ‘Multinational Corporations, Globalisation, and the Challenge of Self-Regulation’ in John 
J Kirton and MJ Trebilcock (eds), Hard choices, soft law : voluntary standards in global trade, environment and social 
governance (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2016). p 216. 
259 ibid. p 215. 
260 Cloghesy (n 241). p 328. 
261 ibid. p 326. 
  58 
Economics and Private Sector Development at IFC, stated that the signatories are very 
committed and engaged in the Charter, and due to their power and networks across the 
globe, they have the ability to “pull” the whole industry with them towards a certain 
direction. These brands (i.e. the signatories) have the opportunity to implement more 
efficient and environmentally friendlier technological solutions in the different steps of their 
value chains in low- and middle-income countries, which would otherwise not be 
implemented. Brands can also encourage certain solutions due to the influence they have on 
people’s preferences.  
 
“The power to shape demand in the fashion industry is something that can go beyond the particular 
fashion. It goes to demand for lifestyles, it goes to demand for how things are made – and we can use 
that power.”262  
 
Valerie Keller, Co-Founder and CEO of Imagine,263 when asked if the fashion industry 
should solely concentrate on a certain issue (e.g. plastic pollution) or should it try and tackle 
everything at once, stated that there is an abundance of promising initiatives addressing 
important issues across the industry, but they need to be brought together in order for the 
industry to transform as a whole. She emphasised that this is also one of the main reasons 
behind the Charter. She also highlighted the role of the signatories in the transformation by 
saying that business is either a part of the solution or part of the problem; because the 
industry has waited for too long to address the issue, it is now imperative for businesses to 
make sustainability the core of their business models.  
 
“A thousand flowers have bloomed; we need to make some bouquets”264 
 
  
 
262 Hans Peter Lankes at COP25. 
263 Imagine is a for-benefit organisation, which brings together CEO’s from around the world to address 
issues in business, such as the climate change and human rights. The aim is to transform the system towards a 
sustainable and more equal path. ‘Imagine’ <https://imagine.one/> accessed 6 May 2020. 
264 Valerie Keller at COP25, referring to the abundance of initiatives across the industry and the need to 
bring those initiatives together in order to achieve a meaningful change in the industry. 
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Motives for participating in the Charter 
The general reasoning for the need of an environmental initiative in the fashion industry is 
closely associated with the elements of substitute TER. However, when examining the 
relationship between the signatories and the Charter, the possible reasons for participation 
form an example of risk management TER. The motive for joining in a commitment, which 
will (greatly) affect the actors’ way of doing business and which, at first glance, would appear 
to stand against their current business models, could be to avoid certain risks.265 As described 
in chapter 4.2.1, actors participate in risk management TER initiatives e.g. when they want 
to avoid negative consequences of under-regulation. Other elements of the risk management 
approach include the avoidance of stricter and more costly government regulation as well as 
reputational risks, as explained in chapter 4.3 in connection with reasons to participate in 
voluntary codes of conduct. Reputation is a major motivator for engaging in voluntary 
regulation; participation might be motivated by either the enhanced reputation due to being 
associated with a certain initiative, or the avoidance of negative attention and shaming due 
to non-participation. Especially in initiatives which form a kind of “club”, the reputational 
motives are a plausible explanation for participation. The reputational aspect will be further 
discussed in chapter 5.4. 
 
Of course, the true reasons behind each signatory’s participation in the Charter cannot be 
discovered in this paper. However, explanations presented in chapter 4.3 offer a set of 
plausible reasons for participation on a general level – considering that the signatories are 
MNC’s and thus by nature profit-driven, it is highly probable that one or more of the motives 
do apply. 
  
 
265 The prevailing business model in the fashion industry is the linear model, as explained in chapter 3.1.  
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5.3 Credibility of the Charter 
In the previous chapters the Charter was established to be an example of substitute and risk 
management TER – both of which tend to be subject to the same risks. In general, industry 
self-regulation has been described as “voluntary, unenforceable and lacking credibility”,266 
and the issue of accountability is usually seen as a major problem – which are precisely the 
issues usually discussed in connection with both substitute and risk management TER 
initiatives. This chapter shall explore the credibility issues of the Charter, and whether they 
have somehow been addressed.  
 
The first things to notice in connection with the Charter is the voluntary participation and 
the “easy exit” option. The Charter gives the signatories the option of withdrawing from its 
obligations without giving explanations or other reasoning for their decision to exit: 
 
Signatories and Supporting Organisations may withdraw from the Fashion Industry 
Charter for Climate Action and associated obligations at any time by notifying UN 
Climate Change in writing.267 
 
The voluntary participation and the option for withdrawing are the two sides of the same 
coin; on the one hand it may encourage participation by lowering the threshold to engage in 
the initiative, but on the other hand it makes the initiative vulnerable by decreasing its 
strength and credibility as a regulatory instrument. Voluntary participation also means that 
actors cannot be obligated to participate even if it was deemed necessary – for instance, if a 
major emitter refused to participate. This is a common problem for all voluntary initiatives 
and represents one of the fundamental issues of global governance. 
 
In addition to the voluntary participation and exit option, the Charter states the following: 
 
The Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action does not constitute a new formal 
initiative or registered organisation, but work is carried out by the Signatories with 
facilitation from UN Climate Change.268  
 
 
266 Haufler (n 182). p 164. 
267 Modalities of Work, Section 18. 
268 Modalities of Work, Section 2. 
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The fact that the Charter’s role as a formal initiative is denied in the Charter itself somewhat 
undermines its credibility, which is an obstacle many voluntary initiatives face; convincing 
other actors of the credibility of the initiative. For instance, risk management TER initiatives 
are often motivated by the enhanced reputation and the increased profitability associated 
with them – and not e.g. the protection of the environment – which naturally undermines 
their credibility in the eyes of the different stakeholder groups.269 The voluntary participation 
and the exit option, the fact that the signatories establish the rules themselves, and the lack 
of enforcement methods are all examples of elements that reduce the Charter’s credibility. 
However, the deficit created by the aforementioned circumstances has, at least in part, been 
taken into account in the Charter by compensating the shortfalls with other mechanisms to 
induce credibility. 
 
One way to enhance the credibility of a voluntary initiative is to associate it with certain 
relevant legislation, legally binding commitments and/or other reputable initiatives.270 As 
already mentioned in chapter 3.2, the objectives of the Charter are linked to both the Paris 
Agreement and the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard – both of which are widely-known 
and respected commitments based on scientific knowledge. In addition to this, though not 
exactly a part of the targets, the Charter points out that “delivering on the climate agenda 
also contributes to the broader Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development”. The Agenda 
2030 is closely related to other worldwide commitments on climate change mitigation, and 
has been adopted by all UN member states.271 The aforementioned associations aim to boost 
the credibility of the Charter on a more general level, but certain specific risks have also been 
taken into account: the possible incentive towards anti-competitive behaviour has been 
acknowledged by stating that signatories “shall refrain from any such behaviours during or 
in relation to their participation”.272 The risk of anti-competitive behaviour is especially 
characteristic for risk management TER initiatives, which the Charter, too, represents. 273 
 
269 Heyvaert (n 157). p 80. 
270 ibid. p 74. 
271 The Agenda 2030 is “a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity”, which seeks to balance the 
economic, social and environmental aspects of sustainable development, and to bring human rights to 
everyone around the world. It was adopted by UN member states in 2015 along with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG’s). The Agenda aims to eradicate (extreme) poverty and achieve a sustainable and 
resilient path by 2030 via the fulfilment of the 17 SDG’s (and the 169 targets). United Nations, ‘Transforming 
Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (2018) A/RES/70/1 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development web.pdf> accessed 8 February 2020.  
272 Modalities of Work, Section 19. 
273 See chapter 4.2.1. 
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The possibility of anti-competitive behaviour is also characteristic for voluntary codes of 
conduct in general; while the flexibility increases their efficiency as regulatory instruments, 
it also allows for anti-competitiveness among the participants.274 
 
Another way to boost the credibility of an initiative is to seek the support of public interest 
groups. This has also been done in connection with the Charter – at the moment it has over 
30 supporting organisations, which represent a variety of different industries, sectors and 
causes (ranging from sustainable freight NGO’s to universities and to global media 
companies). The UN Climate Change, even though not a supporting organisation, can also 
be seen as a public interest group enhancing the credibility of the Charter. The support of 
the aforementioned organisations and other actors is indeed significant, but perhaps even 
more noteworthy is the signing of the Public Communique at COP25; where 86 signatories 
signed a public pledge to states and governments to assist the industry in the fight against 
climate change. In the Communique, the signatories recognise that “the current solutions 
and business models will be insufficient to deliver on the climate agenda”, and hence “ask 
the political leaders of countries with major fashion production and consumer markets to 
partner with us to bring the industry in line with the Paris Agreement goal”. Kendall Tang, 
a representative of one of the signatories, stated that the Communique “is a very important 
signal to policy makers around the world on the necessity to have the right framework to 
enable and promote actions to reduce our level of carbon emissions”.275 Indeed, the pledge 
from the fashion industry for governments to take action sends a strong message about the 
aims of the industry representatives and gives their intentions more credit. Engaging public 
interest groups and states also enhances the Charter’s transparency and thus makes it more 
accessible to the public – which, in turn, contributes to its credibility. 
 
One reason the methods discussed in this chapter enhance the credibility of the Charter is 
because they put pressure on the signatories; for instance, if they ask for assistance from states 
they also have to be sure to do their part of the job and act in conformity with their 
commitments. Thus, reputational pressure is not only a motivator for participation – it might 
also encourage compliance. Closely linked to, and partly overlapping with, the issue of 
credibility are the issues of enforcement and accountability. 
 
 
274 See chapter 4.3. 
275 ‘Public Communique’ (n 99). 
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5.4 Enforcement and accountability  
As explained in chapter 4.3, if the voluntary self-regulation is intended to substitute 
government regulation (as is the case with the Charter), the issues of accountability and 
enforcement are more pronounced. The methods for ensuring accountability and enforcing 
the rules are quite similar and partly overlapping; the mechanisms range between (fairly) 
formal and informal methods. This chapter shall explore the methods utilised in the Charter 
in connection with both, enforcement and accountability issues.   
 
In the absence of traditional enforcement and coercion methods, the Charter has relied on 
other ways to achieve and maintain compliance among the signatories. One form of 
incentivising membership and compliance in voluntary initiatives is the use of certain 
mechanisms arising from private and intellectual law, such as membership contracts and the 
use of trademarks.276 The Charter expressly denies the use of the name and logo of the UN 
Climate Change, and the members do not have to sign separate membership contracts in 
order to join the initiative,277 but it does include certain similar motivators: 
 
The participation of Signatories and Supporting Organisations in the Working 
Groups will be recognised by UN Climate Change in relevant communications and 
events. Such participation may also be reflected in the Signatories’ own 
communications, by stating that they are a Signatory to the Fashion Industry Charter 
for Climate Action as part of fashion industry’s response to UN Climate Change 
Global Climate Action.278 
 
Working Group 1: Decarbonisation and GHG emissions reductions 
Works to e.g. ”define a system to reward companies that set and achieve more 
ambitious climate targets.” 
 
The lack of mechanisms to hold actors accountable in case of non-compliance is a key issue 
in all voluntary regulation.279 Especially with self-regulatory instruments, where participants 
 
276 Heyvaert (n 157). p 74-75. 
277 To participate, the members are required to sign a letter of commitment, which confirms their intentions 
to support the Charter, implement its principles and engage in the working groups. The letter does not 
contain any actual provisions. UNFCCC, ‘About the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action’ (n 93).    
278 Modalities of Work, Section 12. 
279 Haufler (n 182). p 181. 
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create the rules themselves and decide their own degree of participation, the issue of 
accountability seems quite self-evident and the discussion might even seem completely 
fruitless.280  There are, however, some solutions to this problem; external auditing, public 
reporting and accountability systems within organisations, to name a few. 281 One option is 
to establish an administration committee to manage the functioning of the instrument. 
Ideally the committee would include representatives from different stakeholder groups in 
order to take different viewpoints into account in the development of the instrument. The 
Charter has a Steering Committee, which e.g. officially published the Public Communique 
at COP25. However, no information is publicly available on the committee’s members or it 
is responsibilities. Nevertheless, the committee in itself is a positive step in addressing the 
accountability deficit created by the lack of formal mechanisms to hold actors accountable. 
In addition to establishing a separate committee, opening the meetings and procedures of 
the regime to the public contributes to the improvement of accountability. The UNFCCC 
maintains a section on their website dedicated to the meetings of the fashion industry 
representatives, which contains general information about the meetings as well as meeting 
reports. Moreover, the event held at COP25 in connection with the Charter was open to the 
public, and all presentations and discussions were webcasted. These actions allow the public 
to follow the development of Charter as well as the signatories, and thus in part fill the 
accountability deficit. 
 
The Charter has one key tool with which it intends to hold the signatories accountable: the 
public reporting of GHG emissions. The underachievement or negligence of the signatories 
to report their emissions does not lead to any sanctions, but public reporting is one way of 
putting reputational pressure on the participants by ensuring that no underperformance goes 
unnoticed. During the time of COP25 there were not yet any mechanisms in place for 
tracking and reporting – Laila Petrie, the Vice-Chair of the Charter Steering Committee 
and Co-Chair of the Working Group on decarbonisation, stated that different options were 
still being explored in order to make the Charter “as transparent as possible”. She pointed 
out that some commitments included in the Charter (mainly the action-based targets, such 
as the policy engagement) might need specific ways of reporting, for which the existing 
reporting mechanisms would not work. Petrie also noted that the framework for the Working 
Group targets functions both at the individual company level and collectively on the industry 
 
280 ibid. p 182. 
281 ibid. 
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level. Hence, she stated that it is important to discover the aggregate output of the individual 
companies – how much impact reduction can be seen and how many suppliers etc. and 
different regions are engaged in the Charter via the signatories. This further contributes to 
the reputational pressure arising from the requirement to publicly report emissions – not 
only are the signatories’ emissions being scrutinised, but also the reach of their influence 
throughout their value chains is being followed. However, the Charter does not include 
requirements for external auditing or evaluation and while the public reporting of emissions 
certainly affects the participants’ reputation, the consequences for the companies depend 
largely on the activities of consumers. If consumers are not environmentally conscious, they 
most likely will not care about the company’s GHG emissions, which, in turn, is why the 
education of consumers is vital if the fast fashion industry is to change its ways. While the 
Charter does emphasise the role of education in “building towards changed consumer 
behaviours that reduce environmental impacts”, it leaves the concrete methods and 
implementation unresolved. At the time of writing this (April 2020), none of the 8 Working 
Groups cover the education of consumers. 
 
The abovementioned mechanisms lay at the more formal end of the spectrum, but many 
voluntary self-regulatory regimes rely on informal measures; compliance can to some extent 
be enforced by peer pressure and reputational pressure. Reputation can be an effective tool 
in informal sanctioning, especially when the reputation of one affects the reputation of all. 
The recognition of signatories by the UN Climate Change and a reward system might be 
great motivators for some signatories (perhaps more so for the smaller or less-known ones), 
mostly due to the possible reputational benefits. As already mentioned before, some 
voluntary initiatives create a ‘club effect’ – in these initiatives, where reputation is one of the 
key reasons of joining a ‘club’, the banishment from the group might be a serious and 
undesirable consequence for the actor. This has also been taken into account in the Charter: 
 
In order to ensure the quality and credibility of the work of the Signatories of the 
Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action, UN Climate Change, based on 
consultations with Signatories, may exclude a company or organisation from the list 
of Signatories if its sincerity in participation or ability to participate is reasonably a 
cause for concern.282  
 
282 Modalities of Work, Section 16. 
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In addition, for the informal methods to work properly, it is crucial to establish a well-
functioning and effective complaints-mechanism, as well as commercially significant 
sanctioning.  The Charter does not include the aforementioned mechanisms, and thus relies 
solely on peer pressure amongst the signatories as well as reputational pressure arising from 
participation and e.g. reporting of emissions. 
 
The option of excluding misbehaving signatories from the Charter also raises its credibility, 
as the chances of using the Charter solely for greenwashing decrease. Another viable option 
for voluntary initiatives is using consumer power in the absence of traditional means of 
coercion.283 Consumer power can be harnessed by e.g. organising public campaigns in 
connection with the initiative or by using labels to increase consumer awareness. As already 
mentioned, the Charter does not include options for labelling, but the signatories can 
naturally utilise their participation in their communications.284 Furthermore, the UN 
Climate Change maintains a list of signatories and their participation in Working Groups,285 
which helps the conscious consumer to stay informed about current participants and their 
targets, and can perhaps even follow whether or not they are being fulfilled. The trouble is, 
of course, that the scope of consumers who actively follow the list (and individual 
participants’ websites) is presumably quite small. This is one reason why the COP25 was 
important for the Charter; an eagerly followed conference which also drew a lot of attention 
to the side events, one of them being the publication of the fashion industry’s Communique. 
By publicly reaffirming their intentions and asking for the help of governments the signatories 
achieved two things: 1) they spread knowledge about the initiative and 2) they brought 
attention to the participating companies and their targets. In other words, reputational 
pressure can also be used as a tool for enforcement as well as a motivator for participation 
and compliance.  
 
On a more general level, the role of the civil society is crucial in holding actors accountable 
for their unethical actions. Third parties that are concerned for the social and environmental 
consequences of the MNC’s activities in under-regulated environments have formed an 
 
283 Heyvaert (n 157). p 75. 
284 At least Inditex, H&M Group and Nike, Inc. have all mentioned their participation in the Charter on 
their website. However, the mentions are not easily found, and the average consumer would probably not go 
to the trouble of finding them. 
285 Modalities of Work, Section 15b. 
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important sector – the civil society. 286 Competition and profit maximisation have led 
corporations to move production of goods and services to “low-cost, under-regulated 
environments”, but at the same time technological advances have increased the amount and 
the possibilities of international co-operation between third parties. These third-party 
organisations have the ability to influence MNC’s by organising publicity campaigns, 
boycotts and by putting political pressure on governments and international bodies. 287 The 
civil society’s focus is on issues other than the economic interests of different (business) parties 
– they are concerned about the ethical questions of doing business, such as human rights and 
environmental protection. 288 Which ultimately leads the discussion back to the role of 
reputation – the bad reputation following from a failure to comply with certain requirements 
may be an appropriate punishment.  
 
Enforcement and accountability issues are also closely related to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an instrument. As already established, the Charter is an example of a 
voluntary form of industry-wide self-regulation; there is no involvement of the public, 
essentially no methods for auditing compliance or ensuring accountability, and the rules are 
made by the participants themselves. The efficiency of the Charter can be measured by 
determining its flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and the use of expertise. The 
Working Groups, which each represent a different principle of the Charter, contribute to the 
flexibility of the Charter. As the targets have been divided into smaller areas of work, the 
Charter is more likely to be able to quickly respond to changing circumstances. Also, the 
Working Groups are utilising experts by engaging representatives from the signatories as well 
as the supporting organisations in their work. As an example of a voluntary form of industry-
wide self-regulation, the Charter can be tailored for the specific needs of the fashion industry 
– however, its effectiveness is determined by the number of participants, the incentives for 
compliance and the methods for enforcement it includes. As mentioned in chapter 3.2, the 
Charter has around 100 signatories – considering the size of the industry, this not a big 
number. However, the signatories are major players in the industry and can undoubtedly 
influence the industry’s development; as powerful actors they may be able to set an example 
for the other industry representatives to follow. The enforcement methods and incentives for 
compliance in the Charter are relatively weak, as has been demonstrated in this chapter; this 
 
286 Cragg (n 258). p 222. 
287 ibid. 
288 ibid.  
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decreases the Charter’s effectiveness. The efficiency and effectiveness of the Charter are 
indirectly explored more thoroughly in chapter 5.6 via the analysis of some empirical studies 
conducted in connection with the Charter. 
 
5.5 Summary of the analysis 
In short, the Charter represents both a substitute TER and risk management TER initiative 
– the categorisation depends on the viewpoint. From the viewpoint of the initiator and the 
supporting organisations, the Charter represents a form of substitute TER. From the 
signatories’ point of view, however, the Charter falls in the risk management TER -category. 
The UN Climate Change relies mainly on a combination of principled and expert authority, 
whereas the signatories form an example of entrepreneurial authority. The difficulties that 
the Charter faces are typical for all voluntary initiatives; the voluntary participation creates 
certain vulnerabilities, and the lack of enforcement methods and ways of holding actors 
accountable lead to credibility issues. The existence of the issues has been recognised and the 
Charter offers some solutions to them.   
 
Associating the Charter with legislation and international (legal) commitments, such as the 
Paris Agreement, Agenda 2030 and the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard, raises its 
credibility – as does the public support of states and other public interest organisations. The 
lack of enforcement methods has been compensated by the recognition of the signatories in 
the communications of the UN Climate Change, as well as the reward system for setting and 
achieving targets. The possible exclusion from the Charter works both as an enforcement 
method by putting pressure on the signatories to act in conformity with their commitment, 
as well as a method to hold signatories accountable in case they fail to comply with the 
Charter. The accountability issue is also addressed by requiring the signatories to publicly 
report their GHG emissions. Most of these methods ultimately rely on the power that 
consumers and other actors have over the signatories, by affecting their reputation.  
 
The voluntary participation, credibility issues and the lack of enforcement methods has 
raised questions about voluntary commitments – are they a result of a genuine concern for 
the climate or are they only one more form of greenwashing?289 The concern is that the 
 
289 For instance, H&M has been the target of many critics and has been accused of greenwashing numerous 
times due to discrepancies between their environmentally conscious campaigns and their ‘usual’ forms of 
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initiatives might be used only to boost a company’s business via the enhanced reputation 
they get from participating in them, without actually making any changes to their business 
models. This might lead to a situation where the majority of the industry (especially the major 
emitters) is engaged in various sustainability initiatives and reaping the benefits of seeming 
‘environmentally conscious’, but where in fact the environmental reality remains unchanged. 
This leaves little or no incentive to create new sustainable solutions or impose stricter 
regulation for the industry. The threat of greenwashing is especially relevant regarding the 
enforcement of rules and the possibility to hold actors accountable in case of non-
compliance. 
 
Whether or not the Charter is just another form of greenwashing cannot be concluded solely 
based on a theoretical analysis of its characteristics – however, and unfortunately, a 
comprehensive empirical study is not possible in this research paper. Instead, a few empirical 
studies which have been conducted so far regarding the Charter shall be utilised in the 
following (short) analysis of the Charter in action. The aim is to provide evidence to 
strengthen the theoretical viewpoints offered in this chapter, and to offer some tangible facts 
for the reader about the Charter in practice. 
  
 
production. See Sharlene Gandhi, ‘How Fast Fashion Is Greenwashing’ [2019] Sense and Sustainability 
<https://www.senseandsustainability.net/2019/12/03/how-fast-fashion-is-greenwashing/> accessed 26 
February 2020. And The Fashion Law, ‘Greenwashing’ (2016) 
<https://www.thefashionlaw.com/learn/greenwashing/> accessed 26 February 2020. 
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5.6 The Charter in action 
Greenwashing comes in many forms – it might be e.g. vague promises, omitting information 
and important facts or even providing false information about a company or its products.290 
Even though it is complicated to adequately evaluate whether the Charter is used as a tool 
for greenwashing, a few attempts have been made to more thoroughly analyse its role and 
impacts. 
 
Stand – an environmental advocacy organisation – published a report in 2019 ranking 45 
fashion brands based on their commitments to address their climate impacts. The report 
includes companies, which have committed to the Charter and/or other industry initiatives 
(such as the G7 Fashion Pact). In the filthy fashion climate scorecard companies were given 
points for their climate commitments – the amount of points awarded was higher the more 
concrete the targets were. It was especially noted in the report that no points were given for 
“false climate solutions”, such as focusing only on the transformation towards a circular 
economy model, shifting the burden of action to consumers in the hope that consumers will 
choose to make conscious decisions and the failure to encompass the full value chain.291 The 
report includes 45 major fashion companies, of which only two are on the right track to 
achieve the Paris Agreement target (1,5°C). Most of the Charter’s signatories which were a 
part of the study for the report were placed lower than this – some (e.g. H&M, GAP, PUMA, 
Nike, Adidas) are on a path to 2°C or less of global warming, and some (e.g. Inditex, GANT, 
Esprit, GANNI) on a path to more than 2°C of warming.292 The report is not comprehensive 
and does not concern the Charter specifically, but it goes to show that despite the abundance 
of initiatives a company might be committed to, the targets set by them might still not be 
enough; e.g. targets set by the signatories of the Charter might be in accordance with its 
minimum requirements, but they are not ambitious enough to tackle the industry’s climate 
impacts. This calls for a re-evaluation of the Charter’s targets, as well as more stringent 
measures concerning its enforcement and the accountability of the signatories – or even 
mandatory industry-wide regulation. 
 
 
290 The Fashion Law (n 287). 
291 ‘Filthy Fashion Climate Scorecard’ (2019) <https://www.stand.earth/sites/stand/files/StandEarth-
FilthyFashionScorecard.pdf> accessed 22 April 2020. p 7. 
292 ibid. p 5. 
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Another study was conducted in 2019 by KPMG to assess the targets and actions by the 
original 43 signatories of the Charter.293 The study found three major shortcomings; value 
chain GHG emissions (Scope 3 emissions) are not widely reported (targets no. 2 and 4), 
consumer awareness is not being appropriately improved (targets no. 11, 14 and 15) and the 
industry representatives are not utilising existing tools and standards to improve their 
performance (targets no. 4, 13 and 15). Other areas of improvement found by the study 
include the (transparent) disclosure of GHG reduction goals, further commitment to the 
Science Based Targets Initiative and the extension of climate strategies throughout the whole 
value chain. According to the study, only 37% of the original signatories had disclosed their 
Scope 3 emissions – which, as explained in chapter 3.2.4, are a major contributor to the 
climate impact of the industry. The lack of adequate reporting of Scope 3 emissions could 
be due to the size and complexity of the value chains, as well as the lack of data.294 
 
 
 
 
293 KPMG, ‘Sustainable Fashion: Committing to a Sustainable Future through the Fashion Industry Charter 
for Climate Action ’ (2019) <https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/cn/pdf/en/2019/09/sustainable-
fashion-committing-to-a-sustainable-future-through-the-fashion-industry-charter-for-climate-action.pdf> 
accessed 29 April 2020. 
294 ibid. p 10. O’Rourke (n 194). p 129. 
Figure 2: The reporting of Scope 3 emissions.  
Source: KPMG, ‘Sustainable Fashion: Committing to a 
Sustainable Future through the Fashion Industry Charter for 
Climate Action ’ (2019). p 12. 
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In addition to the lack of reporting in general, the Charter does not specify what emissions 
Scope 3 should include. As figure 2 demonstrates, the indirect emissions of Scope 3 could 
include a variety of sources. Certain examples of the emissions included in Scope 3 are 
extremely relevant for the fashion industry (such as the end-of-life treatment of products, the 
waste generated in operations and fuel and energy related activities). However, as the 
Charter does not require the reporting of specific indirect emissions, the choice of the content 
and the extent of reporting is up to the participants themselves. Without binding 
requirements, it is possible to leave out certain relevant emissions and only report emissions 
from other sources included in Scope 3 (e.g. business travel and employee commuting). For 
now, however, the more prominent issue seems to be the fulfilment of the reporting 
requirement overall. 
 
Around 60% of the retail brands controlled by the original 43 signatories already have a 
sustainability section available on their websites, and 35% of the brands offer an 
environmentally conscious line of products.295 However, as the consumers are becoming 
more and more conscious in their shopping habits, this is not enough; studies have shown 
that consumers would prefer a conscious option if more information was available regarding 
the sustainability of a product.296 The report offers some examples how companies could 
enhance consumer awareness: adding information about a product’s sustainability, offering 
an environmentally conscious line of products or improving their reporting and information 
sharing practices towards consumers. 297 Over 90% of the original signatories (at the time of 
conducting the study) had a sustainability section on their consumer websites, and over 50% 
also provided a sustainability report. 298 However, 33% did not have any kind of reporting 
on sustainability. 299 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
295 KPMG (n 291). p 14. 
296 ibid.  
297 ibid.  
298 ibid. p 16. 
299 ibid. p 17. 
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It was also noticed that the industry is not fully utilising the existing tools and standards to 
assess the climate impact of their actions (e.g. SAC, the Higg Index and ZDHC mentioned 
in chapter 3.1). The report states that the industry already has the necessary infrastructure 
to move towards a more sustainable path, but it is still looking for new measures to address 
the climate impacts – hence, the report concludes that the “signatories should leverage these 
existing foundations to measure their impact and make tangible improvements”. 300 As was 
mentioned in chapter 5.4, at the time of COP25, different tracking and reporting methods 
were still being explored due to the nature of certain targets, for which the existing methods 
would not fit. According to the KPMG report, however, this is unnecessary as appropriate 
mechanisms already exist – in light of this, the signatories might be prolonging the process 
unnecessarily and thus wasting precious time. 
 
Despite the critique of the reports covered above, the Charter got a fairly good reception at 
COP25. Alice Pilia, Senior Policy Adviser at Condé Nast,301 applauded the Charter for 
bringing together different actors ranging from policy makers to fashion brands and other 
relevant actors in the industry, as well as supporting organisations. However, it was also 
agreed by the panellists that the industry is currently underestimating what it takes to 
completely transform the way it operates. There are certain business models (such as the 
circular economy model) which could be beneficial for the industry but are yet to be fully 
 
300 ibid. p 18. 
301 Condé Nast is a global mass media company. Its portfolio consists of several print, digital, video and social 
brands, such as Vogue, Vanity Fair and GQ.‘Condé Nast - About’ <https://www.condenast.com/about> 
accessed 6 May 2020. 
Figure 3: Raising consumer awareness on sustainability.  
Source: KPMG, ‘Sustainable Fashion: Committing to a Sustainable Future through the Fashion 
Industry Charter for Climate Action ’ (2019). p 15. 
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utilized. The objectives of the Charter and the actions of the industry representatives were 
also contested during the panel discussions, and a question was raised regarding the future 
of the industry; are we, as consumers and human beings, expecting too much of the fashion 
industry? There is a decision to be made between continuing as a fast-producing industry by 
switching to more sustainable materials and processes or changing entirely the definition of 
fashionable.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Fashion no longer is the individualised privilege of the high society – it is a multi-trillion-
dollar industry, dominated by large multinational corporations that hold a considerable 
amount of power globally. What these corporations do and decide affects not only actors 
within their own value chains, but other industries and consumers as well. Some might argue 
that the fashion industry has a responsibility of taking a bigger part in the combat against 
climate change with or without binding regulation and strict methods of coercion, but the 
cruel fact remains that the world revolves around business.  On a more positive note, business 
can change; as seen in the COP25 discussions about the Charter, many of the panellists 
emphasised that sustainability is becoming an integral part of the industry. Bottom-up-
initiatives, such as the Charter, can demonstrate the participants’ concern and motivate 
other actors (e.g. states) to act, thus paving the way for binding regulation by encouraging 
agenda setting and compliance with industry standards. The question is not only about GHG 
emissions or transforming the industry into a circular one – it is about combining all issue 
areas to form a comprehensive regulatory framework for the industry as a whole. 
 
The Charter, as good as it may sound, might not be enough to motivate fashion industry 
actors to truly address the impacts they have on the climate and the environment. Some of 
the targets indeed address the most critical parts of the industry (e.g. the 30% reduction in 
GHG emissions, especially in Scope 3 activities) and some methods, such as the public 
reporting of the GHG emissions, might put pressure on the companies to actually follow 
through with their commitment. The inclusion of GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and 
Scope 3 activities in the reporting requirements is certainly significant and brings a 
considerable edge to the Charter in comparison with other industry initiatives. Also, the 
establishment of specific Working Groups to deal with different issue areas is commendable 
– this can e.g. prevent the signatories of using the Charter for greenwashing and it might 
motivate to establish more ambitious targets. However, there are still some major issues to 
be dealt with; first, not all participants are reporting Scope 3 emissions, which form a major 
part of the value chain emissions. Second, the Scope 3 emissions have not been specified in 
the Charter and could be anything a signatory chooses to report, ranging from extremely 
relevant emission sources (e.g. energy and fuel related) to less relevant ones from the fashion 
industry’s point of view (e.g. employee commuting). While all the emissions mentioned in 
connection with Scope 3 definition are relevant in combatting the climate change, the 
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Charter should require the reporting of the emissions arising from the most relevant sources 
in the fashion industry. And third, although the reporting requirement in itself is a positive 
step, as an informal enforcement method it needs some other concrete measures in order to 
function adequately; e.g. commercially significant sanctioning. The Charter lacks any 
concrete methods of enforcement and holding the signatories accountable in case of non-
compliance; this has been left solely in the hands of the signatories themselves as well as the 
public via peer pressure and reputational pressure. 
 
In the absence of traditional enforcement and accountability mechanisms, the Charter relies 
heavily on peer pressure and reputational pressure. Reputational pressure is one of the major 
ways of ensuring compliance with voluntary initiatives; it affects the decision to participate 
in an initiative as well as the compliance with it. It is used as a substitute for traditional 
methods of enforcement and coercion, as well as a mean to hold actors accountable in case 
they fail to comply with their commitments. Consumers hold a lot of power, and their every-
day decisions can have a real impact on the way business is done. In other words, consumers 
can define the future of the fashion industry by choosing to be conscious and making 
informed decisions. This is why Alice Pilia at the COP 25 stated that it is crucial to trigger 
behavioural change – to make sure that consumers get on board with the agenda and make 
sustainable choices in their daily lives. However, to put the future of fashion solely in the 
hands of consumers does not seem right; after all, as the producers of fashion, companies are 
better equipped for changing the “system”. In order to do this, however, the burden of 
transforming the entire system should be divided between fashion industry representatives 
and public authorities. This is why the role of the Communique is crucial – if states take the 
industry’s pledge into account and act on it accordingly, the future of fashion might look a 
lot brighter. 
 
Although the shrinking of the Aral Sea was not due to climate change, it nevertheless cruelly 
demonstrated that “men can destroy the planet.”302 After a visit to the infamous location, 
the UN Secretary-General António Guterres said in his statement, that we should ”use the 
Aral Sea as a symbol of how humanity can destroy the planet and let’s make it a lesson for 
us all to be able to mobilise the whole international community to implement the Paris 
 
302 ‘Catastrophe of Aral Sea Shows “men Can Destroy the Planet,” Warns UN Chief Guterres’ [2017] UN 
News <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/559232-catastrophe-aral-sea-shows-men-can-destroy-planet-
warns-un-chief-guterres> accessed 7 April 2020. 
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Agreement — Governments, businesses, civil society, cities, States — in order to make sure 
that tragedies like the one I have seen in Uzbekistan will not be repeated.”303 As I stood on 
top of an abandoned ship in the middle of a dried-up sea, feeling slightly guilty about the 
cotton shirt I was wearing, I wondered; how many other disasters like this would we let 
happen on the account of being fashionable?  
 
The Charter as well as the abundance of other initiatives across the industry have given me 
a glimpse of hope – perhaps the market forces are indeed more effective in “regulating” an 
industry such as this. However, the lack of binding measures does make the situation slightly 
precarious, and my main question to the fashion industry remains: is it enough? 
 
 
303 Guterres (n 1). 
